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Abstract
Starting from the mid 1970s and early 1980’s, the US and other advanced
economies observed a widening divergence between the growth of average and median
real hourly labor compensation and the average growth of labor productivity. This
decoupling between labor compensation and productivity indicates a decline in the labor
share of national income. Opposite to movements in the labor share, the share of national
income remunerated as capital income has increased with the rise of capital incomes
concentrated largely in corporate sector profits. Key developments since the middle of the
20th century have coincided with the onset of medium-run fluctuations in global labor
shares. These include technologically-driven structural changes that have altered the
employment and wage structure of advanced economies: deindustrialization and labor
market polarization. By focusing on the case of the US, this thesis provides an empirical
and theoretical review of the dynamics behind structural change and its effect on the
functional distribution of income and overall wage inequality. Definite patterns of
structural change and their labor market impacts are distinguished by the particular biases
of technical change, which can be seen as arising endogenously in response to relative
factor prices and social forces. Other key factors when comparing cross-country outcomes
in the evolution of factor shares relate to shifts in market structure and institutional
arrangements that have arguably tilted the balance of power in favor of capital over labor.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
During the postwar years (1945-1973) the US economy achieved high average
levels of economic growth commensurate with direct increases in the standard of living.
Rising living standards were driven mainly through broad-based increases in real wages
which tracked closely with the annual growth of productivity. Starting from 1973, the US
has observed a widening divergence between the growth of average real hourly labor
compensation and the average growth of labor productivity. This decoupling between
compensation and productivity indicates a decline in the labor share of national income,
which denotes the proportion of national income allocated for the remuneration of workers.
Opposite to movements in the labor share, the share of national income remunerated
as capital income has increased; with the rise in the capital share concentrated largely in
corporate sector profits (Karabarbounis and Neiman 2014). A similar process has been
noted in many countries around the world in both advanced and emerging economies
(OECD 2015). Productivity growth is regarded as the basis for rising living standards over
time since the ability of firms to set higher wages is regarded as a function of rising labor
productivity, (Fleck et al. 2011). However, declining labor shares imply a disruption of this
relationship, reflecting that gains in economic growth may not always translate to
improvements in real standards of living. Hence, the split between capital and labor in the
distribution of national income is central to the political-economic question of “who
benefits from growth?” (Atkinson 2009).
1

The causes of the global decline of labor shares are complex and have been linked
to labor market transformations caused by technological change and international trade. A
number of empirical studies (ILO 2011; OECD 2012; Karabarbounis and Neiman 2013)
have emphasized the primary importance of technological change over international trade
in explaining declining labor shares in advanced economies. Advances in production
technology may be characterized as expanding the range of labor tasks that may be
automated and thus carries a labor-displacing effect (automation) that may impact the labor
share. On the other hand, new technology creates new sets of labor tasks that cannot be
easily automated (Acemoglu and Restrepo 2018). The balance between the labordisplacing and task-creating effects of technological change depend on the specific nature
of technological change: it’s particular pattern of “bias” and the ease to which certain labor
tasks may be substituted for capital.
Finally, there is contention in recent literature that the impacts of technological
change on labor shares are overemphasized. Indeed, there are major difficulties involved
with an entirely technology-based approach to the problem of declining labor shares. The
main shortcoming of this approach is that it does not fully account for how institutions play
a role in mediating market forces while also perhaps shaping market forces themselves.
This literature has emphasized instead the role of market structure and institutional shifts
in determining a fall in the labor share. Novel data shows that the decline of the labor share
has coincided with an unprecedented increase in “pure” corporate profits, as opposed to
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conventional returns on capital,1 suggesting the emergence of a “non-zero rent economy”
under the neoliberal policy paradigm (Eggertson et al. 2018).
Three key questions arise. First, what empirical patterns of capital deepening and
technical change have disrupted the relationship between productivity and labor
compensation in the US? Second, how can particular patterns of observed bias in embodied
technical change be regarded as arising endogenously? Third, are purely technologicaleconomic factors sufficient to explain the problem of declining labor shares? The primary
aim of this thesis is to provide an answer to each of these questions through an exploration
of the dynamics behind productivity growth and labor compensation within the overall
context of labor market transformation, induced technical change, and institutional shifts.
Capital deepening refers to an increase in the proportion of the capital stock to the
number of labor hours worked. Secular increases in the capital-labor ratio are closely
related to movements in the productivity of labor. Holding other factors constant, an
increase in capital deepening leads to an increase in labor productivity but not necessarily
an increase in real wages, as noted above. A large portion of productivity increases in the
US since the 1970’s has been driven by capital deepening, which has been widespread
across most workers in the economy (Bivens and Mishel 2015). At the same time that highskilled workers have gained access to additional and more advanced capital (i.e. doctors
working with imaging machines, software programmers with advanced computer systems),
so have less-skilled workers (i.e. cashiers working with bar-code scanners, construction
workers using bulldozers). However, adverse distributional impacts of capital deepening
1

The analysis in (Eggertson et al. 2018) estimates the capital share directly as opposed to simply
taking the residual of the labor share. This method reveals the existence and growth of a third
distributive residual termed “pure profits” independent of the returns to capital.
3

across the economy are possible when the specific forms of capital are considered
substitutable for specific kinds of work (i.e. low-skilled, routine-intensive tasks).
Using the concept of embodied technological change we can identify the unique
role played by the substitutability of specific forms of capital in the adoption of new
production technology. Certain forms of capital may be characterized by having a greater
degree of substitutability with respect to labor tasks and therefore may be regarded to carry
a strong “deskilling” bias. This notion of embodied technological change is rooted in the
Classical view of machine capital, developed by David Ricardo and Karl Marx. In Marxian
terms, since machinery combines both motive power and labor power, the characteristic of
machinery as capital takes on a qualitative transformation whereby it directly substitutes
for the individual laborer as opposed to merely augmenting the productivity of labor. In
modern terms, we see a similar process with various forms of technology-intensive capital.
Since the 1980’s declines in the price of capital goods, particularly in machinery equipment
and computer and information technology (ICT), have been linked to an increasing rate of
capital deepening and a greater capacity for labor-saving technical change through
automation. The impacts of labor-saving technical change in recent decades are directly
linked to historical transformations in the employment structure of advanced economies
that have had direct impacts on the aggregate labor share and overall wage inequality:
deindustrialization and labor market polarization.
In the standard analysis of declining labor shares, the relationship between an
increase in productivity and an increase in wages depend on the particular bias of technical
change and the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor. When capital goods are
freely substitutable for labor, the increase of capital per worker induces the rate of increase
4

in labor productivity to grow at a proportionally higher rate than the growth of real wages.
As will be seen, the degree to which specific kinds of capital goods are substitutable for
labor is up for debate. With the secular accumulation of capital, globalized markets and
biased technological progress, Piketty (2014) has argued that capital-in-general may have
become more easily substitutable for labor over time. However, there is little consensus as
to the substitutability of capital for labor in the aggregate. In addition, there is substantial
variation in the degree of capital-labor substitutability across industries and employment
categories which may be responsible for the process of structural change. Chapter 2
provides an overview of these debates regarding the empirically observed patterns of
technical change and the elasticity of substitution, while providing attention to recent
empirical trends related to technologically-driven structural changes and their labor market
impacts.
Chapter 3 takes a history of thought approach to the question of how particular
patterns of embodied technical change be regarded as endogenous. Starting from the
origins of neoclassical growth theory and the induced innovation hypothesis, key concepts
are identified relating the direction of technical change to factor substitution and the
distribution of income. Chapter 4 continues this approach while turning to an alternative
growth and distribution framework stemming from the classical-Marxian perspective on
induced technical change. Whereas the standard approach to technical change and
declining labor shares explains distributional outcomes as a matter of market forces, the
alternative classical-Marxian perspective highlights the role of institutional and social
factors in determining distributional outcomes. This alternative perspective offers a segue
into Chapter 5, which considers the impact of market structure and institutional shifts on
5

the functional distribution of income by introducing a framework to analyze market power
and countervailing “worker power” in the labor market. Key changes in market structure
and institutional arrangements are identified that have affected distributional outcomes in
the US. Chapter 6 provides concluding remarks.

6

Chapter 2: Declining Labor Shares, Structural Change, and Biased
Technical Change

Declining Labor Shares
On average, the long-run shares of national income earned by capital and labor in
advanced economies have exhibited remarkable stability over time. This stability is
famously enshrined in the long-run patterns of capitalist growth that have come to be
known as Kaldor’s Stylized Facts of Growth. These can be summarized as follows: 1)
constant factor income shares, and 2) a growing capital intensity and output per worker,
and 3) a constant capital-output ratio (denoting the productivity of capital). Historically,
the long-run average constancy of factor shares persisted in advanced economies for much
of the 20th century. However, developments since the middle of the 20th century have
coincided with the onset of medium-run fluctuations in global labor shares. In the late
1960s and early 1970’s, labor shares increased significantly for many advanced economies
thanks to a rapid growth in real wages. This trend was reversed by the mid-1970’s and into
the early 1980’s, with labor shares around the world beginning a period of significant
decline. The rate of decline in the wage shares of almost all advanced countries accelerated
into the early 1990’s and 2000’s (OECD 2012).
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According to one estimate, the labor shares of advanced economies have declined,
on average, from 73.4 percent in 1980 to 64 percent in 2007 (Stockhammer 2017). The
magnitude of decline across OECD countries, however, has varied considerably. Labor
share declines are barely apparent in the UK and in Denmark, while declines are much
more pronounced in many European (Germany, France, Italy, Ireland) and Asian (Japan,
Korea) countries. The decline in the labor share for the US, which is the focus of this paper,
has been comparably moderate, although labor shares in the US have historically been low
comparable to European economies (Bassanini and Manfredi 2012).
Historical data for the US in Figure 1 reveals a strong pro-cyclical tendency for the
aggregate labor share: generally rising with periods of labor market tightness at the top of
expansionary cycles, remaining high at the start of recessions, and then falling steeply as
the recession progresses and throughout the initial recovery period. During the late 1960’s
and early 1970’s, the labor share of income in the US fluctuated in the mid-60’s range.
Two major declines in the baseline fluctuation of the US labor share occurred in the mid1970’s and during the 2000’s. The labor share fell roughly 4 percentage points from 19741984 before rising temporarily through the 1990’s until the collapse of the dot com bubble
in 2001. By the post-2008 recovery period, the labor share had fallen to a baseline
significantly below its former cyclical variation.

8

Figure 1: The US Labor Share 1950-2019

Source: University of Groningen and University of California, Davis, Share of Labor Compensation in GDP at Current
National Prices for United States [LABSHPUSA156NRUG], retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

Particularly in the US, but also seen in other countries, relatively moderate mediumrun declines in the labor share have concealed a rising inequality in labor compensation
(including wage and non-wage benefits). Elsby et al. (2013) show that the aggregate labor
share in the US has been “buoyed up” over time by the rising income shares of very rich
workers such as top corporate managers and executives. Higher capital shares are also
associated with a higher income inequality because incomes from capital are mainly
concentrated at the higher end of the income distribution (Piketty 2014). In contrast, the
average household derives the main proportion of its income from wages. If the labor
incomes of top managers and executives were counted as capital incomes, then declining
labor share trends would likely be more pronounced (Stockhammer 2017). Finally, the ILO
9

(2011) reports falling labor shares for low and medium-skilled workers and rising shares
for high-skilled workers for a sample of advanced economies. As we will see, this fact
relates to the notion of capital-skill complementarity and skill-biased technical change but
also to inequalities in the distribution of labor market rents.

A Framework for Declining Labor Shares
The starting point for the study of movements in factor income shares is the work
of John Hicks (1932, 1964) and Joan Robinson (1959) on the functional distribution of
income. Hicks and Robinson both emphasized the distributive role played by the elasticity
of substitution between capital and labor. The elasticity of substitution describes the ease
by which capital and labor may be substituted for each other in production. More generally,
the elasticity of substitution is a measure of the sensitivity of the firm’s capital-labor ratio
to changes in relative factor prices.
With competitive factor pricing, the profit rate is equal to the marginal productivity
of capital 𝑟 = 𝐹$ and the wage is equal to the marginal productivity of labor 𝑤 = 𝐹& . For
a standard aggregate production function with constant returns to scale, the elasticity of
%𝛥(𝐾/𝐿)

substitution may be expressed as 𝜎 = %𝛥(𝑤/𝑟), where K and L represent quantities of capital
and labor in use and 𝛥 denotes change in percentage terms. The elasticity of substitution
may change with production techniques over time. As pointed out in Piketty (2014), with
technological progress and economic development, the nature of advanced forms of capital
may impart the long-run tendency for the elasticity of substitution to increase, meaning that
capital may in principle become more substitutable for labor over time. However, for the
10

family of CES functions including Cobb-Douglas, the elasticity of substitution remains
constant.
Actual economies follow typical growth patterns where the ratio of capital to labor
is increasing over time. This occurs because the rate of capital accumulation tends higher
than the growth rate of the labor supply, leading to an increasing relative supply of capital.
A larger capital stock enables the use of more capital goods per worker (capital deepening),
which leads directly to increases in labor productivity. In the neoclassical framework with
competitive factor pricing, a rising capital-intensity causes wages to rise with the
productivity of labor and the profit rate to fall due to the diminishing returns to capital.
Under the classical-Marxian framework (covered in Chapter 4), capital deepening also
leads to a decline in the profit rate over time although factor pricing is considered to be
determined by institutional conditions and the outcome of class conflict. In either case,
secular increases in the wage level induce firms to substitute factors (as capital becomes
cheaper relative to labor costs) until they reach even more capital-intensive techniques of
production, leading to additional gains in labor productivity (Foley et al. 2019). The
distribution of the gains to productivity will depend on the elasticity of substitution, or
more generally, on the capacity for certain labor tasks to be automated by certain forms of
capital. As will be shown in a later section, this capacity for automation differs substantially
across different worker groups according to industry and skill-education level.
Following Lawrence (2015), we can describe the ratio of factor income shares as
0$
1&

. According to the diminishing returns to capital, the profit-wage ratio and capital-labor

ratio will generally move in opposite directions as the relative supply of K increases. For
11

factor shares to remain constant requires that the change in the capital share 𝑟𝐾 be equal to
the change in the labor share 𝑤𝐿. This occurs whenever 𝜎 = 1, as in the standard CobbDouglas production function. Following an increase in the relative supply of capital, the
factor price ratio adjusts proportionally with higher wages and lower profits such that the
factor income ratio remains constant. The corresponding increase of the wage level induces
firms to raise the productivity of labor (through capital deepening) by an equal proportion
to the increase in wages.
For the labor share to fall, the proportion of total income remunerated to capital,
𝑟𝐾, must increase by more than the proportion remunerated to labor, 𝑤𝐿. This is possible
whenever 𝜎 > 1, which indicates that the possibilities for substitution (e.g. automation)
between capital and labor are high. In this case, capital and labor are considered to act as
gross substitutes in production. Opportunities for direct capital-labor substitution imply
that profit-maximizing firms will be highly sensitive to changes in factor costs and will
make significant shifts toward more capital-intensive techniques in response to even a
small increase in wages. Accordingly, a given percent increase in the wage level will induce
a proportionately greater increase in labor productivity, leading to a rate of productivity
growth which exceeds the growth of wages consistent with a decline in the labor share.
Similarly, a given percent increase in the capital-labor ratio will lead to a proportionately
smaller decrease in relative price of capital consistent with a rise in the profit share
(Lawrence 2015).
On the other hand, if 𝜎 < 1, capital and labor are considered gross complements. In
this case, the possibilities for direct substitution are low so that firms will require a
12

comparatively larger increase in wages to induce a switch to more capital-intensive
techniques. An increase in the wage level induces a proportionately lower increase in labor
productivity, so that a given percentage increase in 𝐾/𝐿 will be offset by a proportionately
larger percentage decrease in 𝑟/𝑤, leading to an increase in the labor share and a fall in the
profit share.
In Elsby et al. (2013), the supposed relationship between movements in the labor
share of income and the capital-labor ratio is given by the equation 𝛥 𝐿𝑠 = −(1 − 𝐿𝑠)

𝜎−1
∗
𝜎

𝛥(𝐾/𝐿), where Ls is the labor share of income. According to this expression, the elasticity
of substitution relates changes in factor shares to changes in the capital-labor ratio. In
particular, the labor share may decline with a rising capital-labor ratio (capital deepening)
when the elasticity of substitution is greater than one. However, knowing the elasticity of
substitution and the capital-labor ratio are not sufficient conditions to explain movements
in factor shares where there is a positive rate of technical change (Lawrence 2015). Taking
technical change into account, the central component for movements in factor shares
becomes the change in the effective capital-labor ratio 𝑘 = (𝐴$ 𝐾/𝐴& 𝐿), where 𝐴& and
𝐴$ give measures of labor- and capital-augmenting technical change respectively. When
the change in 𝐴& and 𝐴$ are equal, the pattern describes “Hicks-neutral technical change”
where the marginal products of both factors are augmented equally.
As will be discussed in Chapter 3, the neutrality of technical change formed the
basis for traditional theories of balanced growth. However, much of technological progress
in history has been observed to be non-neutral i.e. biased in favor of one factor over the
other. The bias of technical change is defined according to its relative impact on the
13

marginal products of capital and labor (Hicks 1932). Technical change may be classified
as net capital-augmenting when it raises the marginal product of capital by more than it
raises the marginal product of labor. This pattern of technical change is also described as
“labor-saving” since less labor is now required relative to capital goods in order to produce
a given level of output. Similarly, technical change is net labor-augmenting (or capitalsaving) when it raises the marginal product of labor higher than it raises the marginal
product of capital. Including the possibility for biased technical change in the Elsby et al.
(2013) equation gives the following form: 𝛥𝐿𝑠 = −(1 − 𝐿𝑠)

𝜎−1
𝜎

∗ 𝛥(𝐴𝐾 𝐾/𝐴𝐿 𝐿), where net

labor-augmenting technical change arises when 𝛥𝐴𝐿 > 𝛥𝐴𝐾 and net capital-augmenting
technical change arises when 𝛥𝐴𝐾 > 𝛥𝐴𝐿 . From this framework, we may recognize
movements in the labor share as a function of the elasticity of substitution, the capital-labor
ratio, and the pattern of biased technical change described by the magnitude of the change
in 𝐴& and 𝐴$ .

Explaining Declining Labor Shares
An important contribution to the problem of declining labor shares in the 1980’s is
referred to as the “wage-push” argument. During the late 1960’s, Europe and the US
experienced rapidly rising real wages which did not generate higher unemployment or alter
the functional distribution of income thanks to concurrent improvements in overall
productivity (Blanchard 1997). While the growth of real wages continued into the early
1970’s, advanced economies around the world came to be faced with the famous
“Stagflation” crisis of low productivity growth (and high inflation rates), resulting in a
14

rising labor share. This rise in the labor share is argued to have generated the high
unemployment across OECD countries observed during the stagflation years (Blanchard
1997). Although wage growth trends flattened into the 1980’s, they had not led to a
reduction in unemployment for most countries, as in Europe where unemployment rates
have remained high.
The argument in Blanchard (1997) is that rapidly rising wages into the early 1970’s
are a result of a wage-push enabled by institutional conditions and workers leveraging an
increased state of bargaining power, resulting in higher wages and lower employment in
Europe and the US. During the 1980’s, the reversal of wage and employment trends
reflected the response of firms devoting a higher proportion of resources to capital
deepening and capital-biased (labor-saving) technical change. Similarly, overly rapid wage
increases during the 1970’s may be regarded as causing a delayed reaction in the rapid
substitution of capital for labor in the 1980’s (Caballero and Hammour 1998). According
to the framework in Bentolila and Saint-Paul (2003), a shift toward net capital-augmenting
technical progress along these lines has reduced the strength of the one-to-one “ShareCapital (SK) relation” between capital intensity and the labor share, causing the
distributional impacts of a rising capital intensity to be heightened. In essence, these
explanations describe declining labor shares as a result of an increase in the rate of factor
substitution and labor-saving technical change as a corrective mechanism for the
discrepancy between real wages and productivity in the 1970’s. However, this
“macroeconomic substitution explanation” for declining labor shares lost ground when
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unemployment rates remained high and wage shares continued to fall into the 1990’s
(Brugger and Gehrke 2017).

Factor Substitutability and Capital Deepening
According to the framework in Elsby et al. (2013), there are two possible
explanations for declines in the labor share of income. First, in the case where capital and
labor are gross substitutes, 𝜎 > 1, a rise in the effective capital-labor ratio 𝑘 will lead to a
decline in the labor share. A rise in 𝑘 is consistent with either capital deepening or capitalaugmenting technical change, or both. A set of important studies have offered a series of
estimations placing 𝜎 greater than one, arguing that declining labor shares are a result of
increases in the effective capital-labor ratio.
Karabarbounis and Neiman (2013, 2014) have argued that sharp declines in the
price of capital goods since the 1980’s have prompted an increased rate of capital
deepening among advanced economies. Declines in the price of capital goods are directly
connected to efficiency gains from technological advancements in capital-producing
industries, particularly equipment/machinery capital and information and computer
technology (ICT) industries. It is theoretically possible for a decline in the relative price of
capital goods to shift the elasticity of substitution greater than one across industries and
sectors intensive in equipment/machinery or ICT capital. As the relative price of capital
falls, optimizing firms become more sensitive to the rising relative cost of labor and
respond through capital deepening and labor substitution. A key result in Karabarbounis
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and Neiman (2013) shows that countries which experienced the greatest decline in the price
of capital goods have experienced sharper declines in the labor share.
As implied by the cross-country analysis in Karabarbounis and Neiman (2013) an
acceleration of the decline in the aggregate labor share in the US since the 2000’s should
have been associated with an observed acceleration of capital deepening. Instead, this
period had seen a slowdown in the rate of capital deepening (Elsby et al. 2013). Only
assuming 𝜎 > 1,the standard neoclassical framework on its own is unable to account for
this pattern. The explanation offered in Elsby et al. (2013) maintains that a large portion of
the decline in the US labor share may be accounted for by rising import exposure and the
offshoring potential of labor-intensive tasks. Import competition and offshoring by US
firms are argued to have raised the elasticity of substitution of key industries above unity.
Moreover, the offshoring of labor-intensive production would be expected to raise the
overall capital-labor ratio of surviving industries (while actual capital investment remains
constant) and thus lead to a decline in the aggregate labor share consistent with the standard
framework. Their analysis identifies a direct association between import exposures and
offshoring volume of labor-intensive tasks with declines in the labor share at the industry
level, largely concentrated in the manufacturing sector. This implies that the globalization
of markets, rather than embodied technical change in production, is the primary culprit for
declining labor shares in advanced economies.

17

Factor Complementarity and Labor-Augmenting Capital
The above explanations depend on 𝜎 > 1 for their arguments to hold. However,
there is little consensus in the econometric literature that the elasticity of substitution in
advanced Western economies is above one. Estimates placing 𝜎 > 1 are overshadowed by
a preponderance of evidence in the econometric literature in favor of the “gross
complements” perspective. Estimation surveys covering a wide range of studies using a
variety of estimation and calibration techniques have concluded that both the short-run and
long-run elasticity of substitution is less than one (Klump et al. 2004; Chirinko 2008;
Chirinko and Mallick 2014). Accounting for the possibility of biased technical change,
Young (2010) shows that the elasticity of substitution in the US is substantially below one
in the aggregate and for a large majority of industries in the sample.
That the aggregate elasticity of substitution is estimated at below unity is significant
as it suggests that capital remains complementary to labor in general, meaning that there
is no inherent tendency for capital deepening to cause a fall in the aggregate labor share.
Indeed, if capital and labor are gross complements, a decline in the labor share necessitates
a decrease in the effective capital intensity 𝑘, since this would lead to a higher marginal
product of capital and higher rental rate. Despite an observed increase in the overall capital
intensity of the US economy, it is possible to reconcile a declining k if there is net laboraugmenting technical change in the aggregate; in other words, if the rate of labor
productivity growth exceeds the rate of capital productivity growth.
A decline in the effective capital-labor ratio is consistent with evidence that the
historical pattern of aggregate technical change in the US has been net labor-augmenting
18

(Antras 2004; Young 2010). While much of the observed growth in the capital-labor ratio2
in the US has been concentrated in manufacturing, especially since the 1990’s, the most
recent increases in the capital-labor ratio have not been driven by additional capital
investment. In fact, according to Lawrence (2015), capital investment in manufacturing has
dramatically slowed since the 2000’s. Rather, increases in the capital-labor ratio have been
driven by decreased labor input requirements in the manufacturing sector leading to layoffs
and restructuring. The primary driver of layoffs is identified in the higher relative rates of
labor productivity growth achieved in the manufacturing sector, rather than exposure to
trade and offshoring opportunities.
According to Klump et al. (2007), while US production data indicates net laboraugmenting technical change in the long-run, capital-augmenting technical change has
occurred during ‘transitional’ periods as in the response to the “wage-push shock” of the
1970’s. Chen (2017) estimates that labor-productivity growth weakened significantly
across most US sectors from 1980-1995 consistent with an increase in capital-augmenting
technical change (with the notable exception of the energy sector and computer/electronics
industries). Since the 2000’s, however, strong relative labor-productivity growth has
returned to the manufacturing sector at the same time that we observe the slowdown of
capital investment and declines of the employment share of manufacturing. Altogether,
these facts point toward the importance of looking at variation of labor-productivity growth
and labor shares across sectors.

2

Growth in the capital-labor ratio reflects an increase in the ratio of net fixed capital stock to fulltime employment (Lawrence 2015).
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Variation in Labor Shares at the Sectoral Level
An important question lies in distinguishing between the impacts on aggregate labor
shares of changes in sector shares in output or in changes in labor shares within industries.
Using shift-share analysis, the overall change in the labor share in gross value-added may
be decomposed into between-industry changes and within-industry changes. Changes in
the labor share of income may reflect compositional changes in the industrial sectors of the
economy (Heintz 2013). Supposing sectors with relatively low labor shares expand relative
to sectors with high labor shares, it is reasonable to believe that the total labor share will
fall. A well-replicated finding concludes however, that movements in labor shares at the
sector level reflect changes within industries rather than between industries (OECD 2012;
Karabarbounis and Neiman 2013; Elsby et al. 2013).
Studies looking at cross-sectoral variation have revealed that the long-run stability
of factor shares in advanced economies have obscured substantial volatility of labor shares
within industries. Karabarbounis and Neiman (2013) show that global declines in the labor
share since 1975 have been concentrated in mining, transportation, and manufacturing.
Conversely, labor shares have tended to increase in agricultural sectors and in financial and
business services. These patterns are largely corroborated in Lawrence (2015) for the US.
The period between 1987-2011 saw large declines in labor shares in manufacturing (68 to
52 percent) and in mining (40 to 28 percent), with smaller though substantial declines in
retail and wholesale trade, transportation, and information technology. Large declines in
labor shares within manufacturing depressed the aggregate labor share in the US. However,
after the 1980’s the effect was greatly offset by the substantial increase in labor shares
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within service industries, particularly in financial and professional services, and in
healthcare.

Substitution and Structural Change
Declines in the labor shares of manufacturing industries reflect substantial
decreases in the employment share of manufacturing (deindustrialization) rather than
slowdowns in the rate of compensation growth (Lawrence 2015). The process of
deindustrialization has been particularly apparent in the US and Europe but has also
occurred in Japan and more recently in the “Asian Tiger” economies. Cross-country
declines in manufacturing employment vary significantly in time and in magnitude.
However, from the 1970’s onward the average manufacturing share of employment has
declined significantly among the majority of advanced economies (Rowthorn and
Ramaswamy 1999). Declines in manufacturing employment across advanced economies
have coincided broadly with rising employment shares in the service sector. This is most
dramatically observed in the US where the employment share of the service sector
increased from 56 percent in 1960 to 74.9 percent in 1994, and then rose to 81.2 percent in
2010.
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Figure 2: Sectoral Employment Shares in the US 1970-2012

Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Percent of Employment in Manufacturing in the United States
(DISCONTINUED) [USAPEFANA], Percent of Employment in Services in the United States (DISCONTINUED)
[USAPESANA], retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

The process of deindustrialization began earliest in the US during the late 1960’s.
Figure 2 shows this pattern using sectoral employment data for the US, where the
manufacturing share of employment fell from its peak of 28 percent in 1965 to 10.1 percent
in 2010, with the bulk of deindustrialization occurring during the recessionary periods of
the 1970’s and 1980’s. The level of manufacturing employment was fairly stable between
1990 and 2000 but continued to decline more steeply after 2000. Lawrence and Edwards
(2013) estimate the number of employment sector jobs lost between 2000 and 2010 at 5.8
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million, with many of these losses occurring during the 2001/2002 and 2007/2008
recessions, the period with the steepest declines in the aggregate labor share.
The main contention in the deindustrialization literature is the extent to which
declining employment shares in manufacturing are caused by “external” factors related to
exposure to globalized markets or the “internal” productivity growth dynamics of advanced
economies. A number of economists, Sachs and Schatz (1994), Woods (1994, 1995), and
Saeger (1996), have explained deindustrialization as a result of increasing trade integration
between developed and developing countries. The common thread among these authors is
that increases in imports of manufacturing goods from developing countries that are highly
labor intensive directly leads to a displacement of manufacturing workers in advanced
economies.
Even under conditions of balanced trade, North-South integration will, in theory,
lead to a reduction in manufacturing employment in advanced economies since the number
of jobs lost in the unskilled-intensive industries are typically greater than those gained from
the growth of skilled-intensive industries (Wood 1994, 1995). During the 1970s and 1980s
the world saw a significant shift in the concentration of labor-intensive manufacturing from
the developed core to the Global South, particularly in Asia. This is said to reflect shifts in
comparative advantage with respect to unskilled-intensive manufacturing on the basis of
differential labor costs. This pivot in production to Asia has continued steadily over time
with the growth of manufacturing exports in China’s economy in the 1990’s and into the
2000’s. During this period, the US experienced substantial manufacturing trade deficits
with emerging economies in Asia, particularly China after the 2000’s (Autor et al. 2016).
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Another channel that links economic globalization with deindustrialization is the
offshoring and outsourcing of production. Advancements in transportation and
communication technology had greatly enabled the free global movement of capital. Major
outflows of capital from the United States and other advanced economies to the Global
South have played a key role in the rise of manufacturing shares in Southeast Asia and
China (Thorbecke and Salike 2011). The relocation of production often took advantage of
lower wages, looser labor or environmental regulation, lower taxes, and other conditions
that would reduce production costs overall. During this period, many US-based firms began
transferring production facilities overseas. Many goods that were previously produced in
the United States and exported abroad had begun to be produced overseas (Welling 2012).
The emerging consensus of the deindustrialization literature indicates however, that
the main impacts of globalization: manufacturing trade deficits and offshoring act as
accelerants of deindustrialization rather than its main cause. In effect, trade specialization
among advanced economies may explain why some countries deindustrialize faster than
others (Rowthorn and Ramaswamy 1999). Rowthorn and Ramaswamy (1997, 1999),
Lawrence and Edwards (2013), and Kehoe et al. (2013) have maintained that
deindustrialization is principally a consequence of rising effective capital intensity and high
relative productivity growth in manufacturing with a labor-saving bias. The argument here
is that the principle cause of structural change lies in sectoral differences in labor
productivity growth. As manufacturing industries are capable of higher average
productivity growth than industries in the service sector, less manufacturing workers are
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required to produce equal or greater rates of output with the effect that many of them are
displaced and migrate to the service sector.
Industries in manufacturing or agriculture are considered more amenable to
technological progress due to their potential for standardization (Rowthorn and
Ramaswamy 1997). Accordingly, sectoral differences in productivity growth may be
linked to differences in the growth of capital intensity and the elasticity of substitution,
which are both higher in agriculture and manufacturing than in the service sector (AlvarezCuadrado et al. 2017). In consequence there is a systematic tendency for manufacturing
industries to achieve relatively high rates of labor productivity (Rowthorn and Ramaswamy
1999). Despite the possibility of under-measurement of productivity in the service sector,
there is some consensus that productivity growth in the manufacturing sector has been
generally high relative to the broader US economy (Rowthorn and Ramaswamy 1997).
Lawrence and Edwards (2013) estimate that productivity growth rates in the manufacturing
sector surpassed the rest of the economy by an average of 1.51 percentage points a year
over the period 1960-2007.
While, on one hand, faster productivity growth implies higher rates of labor saving
in the manufacturing sector so that less labor is necessary over time to produce any given
level of output. On the other, faster productivity growth also leads to a decline in the price
of manufactured goods, stimulating an increase in demand for them. Lower prices due to
productivity gains may stimulate sufficient demand to raise the manufacturing demand for
labor and potentially offset the labor-saving effect. Lawrence and Edwards (2013) show
that US expenditures on domestic manufactured goods relative to services have steadily
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decreased since the 1960’s, suggesting that the demand-effect has grown increasingly
insufficient to offset the labor-saving effect of productivity growth in manufacturing. The
net effect of more rapid productivity growth leads therefore to reductions in the
employment share of manufacturing.
The bulk of labor displacement in the US has been geographically concentrated in
the Northeast and Midwest regions known as the “Rust Belt”. Since well-paying
employment opportunities in these areas have traditionally centered on manufacturing, the
disappearance of these jobs has led to a pattern of economic decay and migration in affected
cities and communities as in the well-known case of Detroit in the 2000’s. In the overall
economy, the main implication of deindustrialization is that the growth of living standards
overall becomes less dependent on productivity growth in manufacturing and increasingly
more so on the service sector, in which productivity growth tends to be slowest (Rowthorn
and Ramaswamy 1997). Low productivity growth in the services sector relative to
manufacturing necessitates an ever-increasing proportion of employment in services in
order to keep service-sector output growth in pace with manufacturing. Overall wage
stagnation at the median in the US is said to reflect the rising weight of services in overall
expenditures over time and the rising relative prices of services (Lawrence and Edwards
2013).

Capital-Skill Complementarity and Routine-Biased Technical Change
Autor and Salomans (2018) find evidence that technical progress in the US has
become more labor-displacing on balance over time, with the largest labor-displacing
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effects occurring in the 2000’s. This effect is linked to the emergence of advanced forms
of capital, particularly in equipment capital and information and computer technology
(ICT) capital. The elasticity of substitution between capital and labor for ICT capital is
estimated to be significantly higher than that of other capital goods and significantly greater
than one (Tevlin and Whelan 2003; Schwellnus et al. 2018). This reflects that ICT capital
offers a wider range of opportunities for substitution, with much of the potential for
substitution being concentrated in routine tasks.
In recent decades, the labor displacing effect of factor substitution using advanced
forms of capital has been generally biased against low-skilled workers, and more especially
biased against workers concentrated in routine-intensive industries. A key characteristic of
modern technical change is the notion of capital-skill complementarity, meaning that the
elasticity of substitution between capital and unskilled labor is higher (more substitutable)
than the elasticity of substitution between capital and skilled workers.3 Krusell et al. (2000)
estimate the elasticity of substitution between capital and low-skilled labor at 1.7 while the
elasticity of substitution between capital equipment and high-skilled labor is estimated at
0.7, implying a high complementarity between capital and skill. The main implication here
is that the growth of the capital stock tends to increase the marginal productivity of skilled
workers while decreasing that of low-skilled workers. With continuous growth in capital
intensity, these estimates are consistent with the findings in ILO (2011) that movements in
aggregate factor shares in advanced economies overlay falling labor shares for low and
medium-skilled workers and rising shares for high-skilled workers.
3

The original formalization of the capital-skill complementarity hypothesis is found in Griliches
(1969).
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Evolution of the College Wage Premium
In the work of Tinbergen (1974, 1975) there is a link between the relative demand
for skills and the particular skill bias of technical change. Technology is considered to have
skill bias when its application increases the demand for skilled workers relative to unskilled
workers. From this framework, the returns to skill are determined by a “race” between the
increase in the supply of skills and the skill bias of technical change. The evolution of the
college wage premium provides a focal point for the literature on the relationship between
technical change and wages. The college premium is the relative earnings ratio of college
workers to high school graduates and provides a rough measure of the labor market
valuation of skill and the returns to education. As shown in Figure 3, the college premium
in the US has risen steadily since the end of the 1970’s despite large increases in the relative
supply of college graduates in the labor force.

Figure 3: College Wage Premium US 1973-2020

Source: Economic Policy Institute, State of Working America Data Library, “[College wage premium, Non-high school
wage penalty ],” 2019. Current Population Survey Outgoing Rotation Group microdata
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Goldin and Katz (2008) document the historical evolution of the college premium
in the United States. An important feature of their analysis is that the college premium has
not always tended to rise. In fact, they show significant compressions of the college
premium during the years 1915-1950 and 1971-1978. In recent decades, the year 1982
marked a major reversal in the falling trend of the college premium which exhibited
substantial increases thereafter. By 2005, the college premium had returned to its former
level in 1915. Two central determinants of the college premium are changes in the relative
supply of more-educated workers (i.e. those with bachelor’s or associate’s degrees) and
changes in the relative demand for more-educated workers driven by the skill bias of
technical change.
The post-war decades saw rapid expansions in the supply of college workers with
particularly accelerated growth during the 1960’s and 1970’s. These trends were reversed
after 1982 with a significant deceleration of the relative supply growth of college workers.4
Meanwhile, the return of the college premium to its 1915 level by 2005 implies that the
relative demand for skill must have grown at a more or less constant rate throughout the
century (Goldin and Katz 2008). Recent movements in the college premium can be
explained in large part as a matter of fluctuations in the relative supply growth of college
workers working in tandem with stable demand growth (for skills) driven by skill-biased
technological change.

4

The main explanations behind the deceleration in supply growth of college workers can be
found in Card and Lemiuex (2001b).
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Goldin and Katz (2008) also find a significant and pervasive role for institutional
factors (i.e. unions, minimum wages, rents) in determining the direction of the college
premium. In particular, the ongoing decline of unions and the erosion of the real minimum
wage since the 1980’s may have contributed to a rising college premium beyond a level
justified by market forces alone (Goldin and Katz 2008). As we will see, it is reasonable to
suspect that institutional forces are at work not just in terms of suppressing less-skilled
wages but also in terms of inflating higher-skilled wages. In particular, workers in certain
sectors (i.e. finance, technology) and workers at the upper-end of the wage distribution (i.e.
executives and upper management) are considered to earn a substantial level of rents.
Overall, the observed increase in the college wage premia may reflect a growing inequality
in the ability of workers to extract labor market rents. This point is important to keep in
mind when comparing cross-country labor market outcomes. The pervasive role of
institutional factors in mediating movements in the wage distribution will be revisited in
Chapter 5.

Wage Dispersion by Skill Group
Acemoglu and Autor (2011) point out three important facts obscured by a focus on
the college premium. First, a major portion of the increase in the college premium after
1980 is explainable on account of steep and continuous increases in the real wages of postcollege workers. Meanwhile, wages for workers with four-year degrees have seen much
more modest increases with overall wage growth for college workers markedly slower after
1980 than in the previous decade. Second, the growing college wage premium indeed
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reflects falling real wage levels for less-educated workers between 1979 and 1992. The
wages of low-skill workers achieved a modest rebound after 1993 but had not reached pre1980 levels by 2003. Accounting for non-wage labor compensation does not skew the
overall result that real hourly compensation for low-skill workers fell after 1980 (Pierce
2001; cited in Acemoglu and Autor 2011).

Figure 4: Wage Dispersion in the US 1973-2020

Source: Economic Policy Institute, State of Working America Data Library, “[Wages by education, Wages by
percentile and wage ratios ],” 2019. Current Population Survey Outgoing Rotation Group microdata

The third feature concerns the evolution of the earnings gap among the low-skill groups i.e
some-college, high school, and high school dropout. Acemoglu and Autor (2011) show
acute expansions in the earnings gap between low-skill groups concurrent with the sharp
declines in overall wage levels after 1980. However, these earnings gaps stabilized
thereafter with wages of all low-skill groups moving largely in parallel with each other.
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The net effect of these three features is that the returns to higher education have grown
more important in explaining wage dispersion over recent decades.
Acemoglu and Autor (2011) show steady overall wage growth for full-time workers
between 1963 and 1973 was fairly even across income deciles. The period after 1973
exhibits a pattern of stagnation for the lower-tail of the distribution (50th percentile and
below) while the upper-tail continued to exhibit strong wage growth through the rest of the
decade, consistent with the rise of post-college earnings. Wages for the 90th percentile saw
a steep and nearly monotonic (constant) rise between 1979 and 2007. Meanwhile wages at
the median saw relatively stagnant growth between 1979 and 1994 with earnings at the
10th percentile declining sharply, consistent with declines in the high school wage. A
period of high-productivity growth during the mid-1990’s helped to raise median and 10th
percentile wage levels, partly reversing the growth of lower-tail inequality. The reversal of
lower-tail inequality reveals the growing non-monotonicity in the distribution of wage
growth after 1995. A polarized structure (U-shaped) of wage growth by earnings percentile
emerges for the period 1988-2008 showing simultaneously faster relative wage growth at
the lower and upper ends of the distribution relative to the middle.

Employment Polarization
Underlying trends in wage polarization are changes in the occupational structure of
the United States and other advanced economies resembling a polarization of employment.
Autor and Acemoglu (2011) show that significant declines have occurred in the
employment share of middle-skill occupations in recent decades, not just in manufacturing
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but also in clerical occupations, administrative support, and sales. From 1979 to 2009, the
employment share of the four major middle-skill occupational categories: sales,
administrative workers, production workers, and operatives had fallen from 57.3 percent
to 45.7 percent. Meanwhile, there has been simultaneous growth in the employment share
of occupations in the high-skill and low-skill sectors. In particular, highly paid occupations
requiring college degrees or above, as in managerial, professional, and technical
occupations, have seen robust employment growth over the three decades since 1980.
Similarly, these trends have coincided with rapid employment growth of service
occupations marked by low-pay and low educational requirements, generally concentrated
in protective services, food and cleaning services, and personal care.
Employment data across three decades reveals an emerging U-shaped distribution
of employment growth becoming more pronounced over time. For the 1979-1989 period,
employment growth by occupation exhibited near monotonicity in occupational skill,
meaning that employment shares of occupations below the median skill level tended to
decline while those above the median skill level tended to rise. In the subsequent period
1989-1999, the graph begins to exhibit patterns of polarization with the most rapid
employment growth occurring at high-skill levels coupled with modestly positive growth
in low-skill occupations and negative growth in middle-skill occupations. For the last
period 1999-2007, the relationship reverses its skew with the most rapid employment
growth occurring in low-skill occupations (Acemoglu and Autor 2011). The rapid
expansion of employment in the service sector is shown in Autor and Dorn (2010) to
account largely for this curling of the lower-tail throughout the 1990’s and 2000’s. The rise
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of service jobs can create downward pressure for low-skill wages as the supply of lowskilled labor expands with the decline of middle-skilled, routine-intensive employment.

Routinization Hypothesis
Based on Autor et al. (2003), the routinization hypothesis links recent advances in
information and computer technology (ICT) with employment polarization through the
automation or offshoring of a subset of core occupational tasks previously concentrated in
the middle-skill segment of labor markets. The driving force of the routinization hypothesis
relates to the rapid adoption of ICT driven by steep declines in the relative price of
computing. Progress in computing technology greatly accelerated during the Second World
War thanks to advances in vacuum tubes and later with the emergence of microprocessors
in the 1970’s. Between 1980 and 2006, the real cost of performing a standardized set of
computations is estimated to have fallen by an average of 60 to 75 percent annually
(Nordhaus 2007).
From a theoretical framework, ICT are considered capital substitutes for workers
performing a well-defined set of cognitive or manual activities termed “routine tasks”. The
term “routine” in this case refers to tasks which follow an explicit set of rules and may be
sufficiently understood so as to be fully codifiable as a series of instructions. Such routine
tasks have been concentrated in cognitive and manual occupations such as bookkeeping,
clerical work, repetitive production and fabrication, and monitoring which traditionally
make up the middle-skill segment of the labor market. The core job tasks that make up
such occupations tend to follow well-defined procedures and as such are increasingly
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subject to codification with computer software. Employment declines in middle-skill
occupations occur as the real cost of computing falls and the task content of middle-skill
occupations is increasingly performed by machines. Moreover, advances in ICT have also
contributed to substantial declines in the cost of offshoring routine, information-based tasks
to foreign workers (Blinder 2007).
On the other hand, ICT are considered capital complements for workers performing
non-routine tasks which generally characterize the work performed by workers at either
end of the occupational-skill distribution. Non-routine tasks may be categorized as either
abstract or non-routine manual tasks. Abstract tasks are those that require complex
problem-solving or analytical capabilities, and characteristic of professional, managerial,
technical, and creative occupations. Such occupations generally require high levels of
education and/or experience. Autor et al. (2003) argue that abstract tasks are
complementary to ICT given that problem-solving and analytical work is heavily reliant
on information as an input - as the price of computing falls then, the productivity of abstract
occupations are complemented. Non-routine manual tasks are those that require the
application of situational adaptability, visual and language recognition, and in-person
interaction in ways that are not strictly codifiable and repeatable.
Manual tasks form the basis of a variety of service occupations like delivery driving
and transportation, home and elder care, food preparation, cleaning and maintenance etc.
While manual workers must be physically and cognitively adept, their occupations in
general require little to no level of formal education. However, the level of required
adaptability and responsiveness required by such occupations renders the core tasks
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exceedingly difficult to codify and automate. Similarly, such tasks are generally not
feasible for outsourcing, with the exception of service occupations in information and
technology industries like call-centers. It follows that the substitution of routine tasks via
automation and outsourcing in turn raises the relative demand for workers able to perform
non-routine abstract and manual tasks. The displacement of occupations intensive in
routine tasks leads to a “hollowing out” of employment opportunities in the middle-skill
segment of the labor market and drives the reallocation of labor to either pole of the
occupational-skill distribution.
Presenting evidence of occupational polarization as a longer-run phenomena,
Barany and Siegel (2018) show that up to half of routine employment from 1950-2007 was
concentrated in the manufacturing sector. These structural shifts are directly tied to
expansions in productivity in key sectors driven in large part by labor-saving technological
progress and/or declining relative prices of machine equipment. Since manufacturing
employment has historically occupied the middle of the wage distribution in the US,
deindustrialization leads to a pattern of income and employment polarization observed in
US data. As relative labor productivity in manufacturing increases, labor must reallocate
from manufacturing to either the low- or high-end service sectors. The reallocation of labor
leads to increased wage growth in the service sectors relative to manufacturing in order to
accommodate for increased labor demand.
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Summary of the Evidence
As we have seen in, the empirical literature provides evidence in favor of 𝜎 < 1
across Western advanced economies and the “gross complements” perspective of declining
labor shares. However, economy-wide estimations of the elasticity of substitution omit
substantial variation of factor substitutability at the sectoral level reflecting in part that
specific forms of capital are uniquely labor-saving. In fact, dramatic structural changes are
possible when labor-saving technical change is concentrated in key sectors (manufacturing
and agriculture) or spreads to new industries, as in the case of ICT capital and routineintensive service occupations.
The decline in the aggregate labor share for the US is driven in large part by changes
in the structure of employment. A large portion of the aggregate declines in the US labor
share are shown to be concentrated in the manufacturing sector (Elsby et al. 2013) and are
linked to declines in the effective capital intensity following secular declines in the
employment share of the manufacturing sector (Lawrence 2015). Declining employment
shares in manufacturing and other routine-intensive industries reflect technical change of
a predominately labor-saving bias given the high substitutability of capital goods for
routine tasks.
The 1970’s and 1980’s experienced a large portion of the shift from manufacturing
into services, corresponding also with a significant decline of unionization rates in the US.
The period following the 1980’s sees a growing dispersion of wages by skill group,
denoting the rising impact of the skill premium and declining wages for low-skilled and
unskilled groups. These facts indicate a substantial reallocation in the benefits to growth in
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the decades after 1973, shifting from a relatively balanced growth path in the post-war era
toward one with major skill-premiums (and differential access to rents) that generate
inequality as long as particular skills and access to education remain scarce.
Overall, the employment effects of technologically-driven structural change reflect
the notion that technological change is not neutral - exhibiting biases toward labor-saving
and capital-skill complementarity. But from where does the bias of technical change come
from? To answer this question, we turn to the wider theoretical context for the relationship
between technical change and economic growth using perspectives from neoclassical and
classical-Marxian theory. The following two chapters turn to the questions of what
implications can be derived for long-term growth if technical change is biased and how the
bias of technical change is determined endogenously through the production choices of
firms.
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Chapter 3: Neoclassical Growth Dynamics and Endogenous
Technical Change

Growth Dynamics: Early Development
The Harrod-Domar model is conventionally regarded as the starting point for
modern growth theory. The approach developed in Harrod (1939) and Domar (1946) is in
the context of dynamic systems. This is opposed to “static” theory, which refers to the
analysis of change in economic variables moving from one state of rest to another. A
limitation of static analysis is the inability to account for continuous increases in the
magnitude of a variable, or otherwise a change in its rate of change. Dynamic theory is
concerned rather with variables’ rates of change, where the essential characteristic of
dynamic systems is that they are self-generating. A key point of emphasis in Harrod (1939)
is that investment flows resulting in net additions to the capital stock must necessitate an
increasing rate of output over time in order to absorb additional capital resources. Harrod’s
fundamental equation describes output growth as a process of capital stock adjustment
whereby the rate of economic expansion increases with net additions in the capital stock
(Rima 2002). A similar finding was independently realized by Evsey Domar.
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Keynesian Underemployment and the Harrod-Domar Instability Problem
The core of the Harrod-Domar model can be described as a set of three growth
rates. The natural rate of growth, the warranted rate of growth, and the actual rate of
growth. The natural rate of growth is the maximum rate of growth allowed by technical
conditions of the system and is consistent with full employment of resources over time in
line with the rate of technological progress. The warranted rate, 𝐺1 , is defined as the
balanced growth rate at which firms are induced to invest at a constant equilibrium rate (no
more, no less) needed to maintain the present rate of growth. The equation for the warranted
rate of growth is given as 𝐺1 = 𝑠/𝐶, where s is the long-run constant average of the
marginal savings ratio across firms and households, and C refers to the ratio of capital
goods required for the production of a unit increment of output.5
In Keynesian fashion, one of the fundamental characteristics of the Harrod-Domar
system is the problem of chronic underemployment. No inherent tendency is given for the
warranted rate to line up with the natural rate given that the warranted rate is not unique
and may vary over the business cycle or due to variations in the interest rate (Harrod 1939).
Moreover, economic forces can often cause the warranted rate to overshoot the natural rate,
which triggers an ‘overcompensation’ mechanism that drops the warranted rate below the
natural rate and vice versa. When the warranted rate is below the natural rate, the average
growth rate may be sustained at a higher level than the warranted due to successive profit

5

The magnitude of C is held to depend on the state of production technology, which determines
the relationship between capital and output and thus may be expressed symbolically as
C=K/Y(Rima 2002). C depends further on the kinds of goods constituting each increment of
output, raising the importance of whether incremental output is labor- or capital-intensive (Harrod
1939).
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booms. However, the warranted rate cannot persist above the natural rate since there will
be a chronic tendency toward economic depression which eventually drags the average
growth rate below the warranted rate (Harrod 1939).
Taking the propensity to save and the capital-output ratio as given, Harrod’s
equation describes how an economic system grows at a constant rate determined by the
productivity of additional capital and the proportion of the gains in output saved and
devoted to investment. The definition of the warranted rate of growth implies that the rate
of growth in period t will be followed by an equal rate of growth in period t+1 (Rima 2002).
Each point along 𝐺1 is an equilibrium point from the perspective of the firm so that the
path of 𝐺1 describes a moving equilibrium or balanced growth path over time for the
economy. However, the growth path of 𝐺1 is highly unstable, sitting at the “knife-edge”
where the actual and warranted rates are equal.
The warranted rate describes an aggregate growth rate of output. However, it cannot
be assumed that all component firms or sectors are expanding at a homogenous rate
(Harrod 1939). The actual rate of growth diverges often from the warranted rate due to
random or cyclical perturbations. Harrod’s instability problem lies in the self-aggravating
forces which occur in response to departures from the warranted rate. If the actual growth
rate exceeds the warranted rate than the actual value of the capital-output ratio must fall
below the warranted rate of C. This causes a depletion of capital stock which induces
further rounds of investment and output expansion. The additional increase in output
introduces further depletion of the capital stock, inducing new expansion. If the actual
growth rate falls below the warranted rate then there is a “redundance” of capital goods
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which induces a dampening effect on investment and output, causing further redundancies
in the capital stock. The actual rate of growth never returns to the warranted rate since the
response to a departure from the warranted rate causes the system to ‘explode’ in a selfaggravating fashion (Harrod 1939). In some respect, the development of subsequent
theories of economic growth can be seen as attempts to address the problems of chronic
unemployment and Harrodian instability.

Stability in The Neoclassical Model
The ‘knife-edge equilibrium’ characteristic of the Harrod-Domar model inspired a
new focus on the question of full-employment and stability in the process of economic
growth. The neoclassical answer to the instability problem is embodied in what is referred
to as the Solow-Swan growth model. The main criticism levied against the Harrod-Domar
approach was against the assumption of fixed-input production functions. The approach
laid out in Solow (1956) constructs a long-run growth model following all of Harrod’s
assumptions, except fixed input proportions. Making use of an aggregate “composite”
capital produced by both labor and capital, Solow allows for substitutability between labor
and capital in production. Dropping the restriction that production take place in fixed
proportions corrects the self-aggravating forces that cause the Harrod-Domar model to
‘explode’. With a ‘flexible’ production function characterized by the freedom of factor
substitution in the long-run, Solow shows that the inherent instability of the Harrod-Domar
system is resolved when production techniques adjust to restore equilibrium. A model
along similar lines was independently developed by Trevor Swan in the same year (1956).
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The aggregate production function appears as 𝑌 = 𝐹(𝐾, 𝐿) with production
assumed to be characterized by constant returns to scale. Let 𝑦 = 𝑌/𝐿 be output per worker
and k=K/L be the capital-labor ratio. The assumption of constant returns to scale enables
the use of the intensive production function 𝑦 = 𝑓(𝑘). The intensive production function,
given in Cobb-Douglas form as 𝑦 = 𝑘 ? , describes the level of labor productivity (output
per worker) consistent with any level of capital intensity (capital per worker) and marginal
productivity of capital 𝛼. The intensive production function is concave and exhibits
diminishing marginal returns to capital, meaning that increases in the quantity of capital
per worker raise output per worker but at progressively smaller increments.
The assumption of diminishing marginal productivity to capital implies that the
productivity of capital, the output-capital ratio p, is a decreasing function of the capitallabor ratio k in the long-run (Foley et al. 2019). Thus, we may posit a feasible production
technique with optimal k at which the addition of further capital yields no further output.
The Solow-Swan model assumes further that the flow of savings is equal to investment.
This implies that the change in the capital stock per period depends on the difference
between the rate of savings, 𝑠 and capital depreciation, 𝛿 . The equation for the rate of
capital accumulation may then be given as 𝑔$ =

CD
$

− 𝛿 = 𝑠𝑝 − 𝛿.

The labor supply is assumed to grow as a function of population growth n given
exogenously at a constant rate. By assuming a growth rate of the labor force consistent
with Harrod’s natural rate of growth, there is assumed to be full employment along the
steady-state growth path of the economy. Since wages adjust instantaneously to ensure that
labor markets clear at whatever choice of technique, the aggregate production function in
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the Cobb-Douglas form can be seen as an infinite continuum of production techniques,
chosen optimally in aggregate by profit-maximizing firms (Foley et al. 2019). If labor
becomes unemployed for a given production technique the wage declines, inducing firms
to switch to more labor-intensive techniques and restore full employment.

Figure 5: Optimal Capital-Labor Ratio
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Source: Adapted from Solow (1956)

Solow’s fundamental equation may then be described by the expression 𝑔F = 𝑔$ −
𝑛 = (𝑠𝑝 − 𝛿) − 𝑛, giving the rate of change of the capital-labor ratio as determined by the
difference between the rate of capital stock accumulation and the growth rate of the labor
force (Solow 1956). As depicted in Figure 5, when the rate of capital accumulation exceeds
the rate of population growth, the capital-labor ratio will be increasing at a positive rate.
The economy converges over time to the optimal capital-labor ratio 𝑘 ∗ and the
44

corresponding productivity of labor 𝑦 ∗ , where the rate of capital accumulation is equal to
the rate of labor force growth. (𝑠𝑝 − 𝛿) = 𝑛.

Exogenous Technological Progress in the Solow-Swan Model
At this point, the Solow-Swan model predicts that labor productivity will cease to
grow as the capital-intensity reaches a constant equilibrium level, 𝑘 ∗ in an economy that
has attained the steady-state. This occurs due to the diminishing marginal productivity of
capital and the growing magnitude of capital depreciation. Historical observation has
shown, however, that output per worker in advanced economies does not cease to grow,
and instead has shown continuous increases over time. This is equivalent to saying that
there has been no advanced economy to reach the steady-state described above. In order to
account for these facts, the Solow-Swan model may be extended with the introduction of
neutral technological progress.
Uzawa (1961) showed that the growth equilibrium of neoclassical models with
technological progress is stable only when it is Harrod-neutral or purely labor-augmenting.
Technological progress is regarded as Harrod-neutral when it’s introduction leaves the
capital-output ratio constant while being consistent with a rising capital intensity and labor
productivity. The capital-output ratio remains constant since output per worker increases
at the same constant rate as the capital-labor ratio. With the rising capital intensity and the
labor share constant,6 it follows that Harrod-neutral technological progress causes the real

6

It is important to note that a constant labor share follows as a property of the Cobb-Douglas
production function since it assumes an elasticity of substitution equal to one.
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wage to rise continuously over time. Thus, the assumption of Harrod-neutrality was
important for explaining Kaldor’s long-run growth facts.
With purely labor-augmenting technological progress, the aggregate production
function now appears as 𝑌 = 𝐹(𝐾, 𝐴𝐿), where A may be referred to as the efficiency of
labor which accounts for the “scaling-up” effect of technology on labor productivity over
time. The term AL measures labor in terms of efficiency units. The efficiency of labor may
be interpreted broadly in terms of the combination of more technically advanced capital
per worker or in terms of human capital inputs, which are required to mediate the capitallabor interaction (Sato and Mitchell 1989). Letting 𝑘 = 𝐾/𝐴𝐿 be the ratio of the capital
stock to effective labor units, the intensive production function in Cobb-Douglas form is
then given as 𝑦 = 𝐴𝑘 ? .

Figure 6: Optimal Growth Path with Technological Progress
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k=K/L

Technological progress introduces additional features to the growth path of the
economy. Increases in output enable higher savings and investment leading to further
increases in the rate of accumulation. Since the persistent growth of investment capacity
cannot be matched by the given growth rate of the labor supply, the capital-labor ratio
grows continuously instead of converging to a steady-state (Solow 1956), moving from k1*
to k2* as shown in Figure 6, and then on to a more capital-intensive point k3* in a subsequent
period and so on. Solow’s fundamental equation becomes 𝑔F = (𝑠𝑝 − 𝛿) − (𝑛 + 𝛾),
where 𝛾 represents the constant rate of technological progress (Foley et al. 2019). In the
balanced growth path with labor-augmenting technological progress, the growth rate of
real output becomes a function of the growth rate of the effective labor supply which
includes the rate of technological progress in addition to the growth rate of the actual labor
supply.

Why Does Labor-Augmenting Technical Change Emerge?
The Solow-Swan model attains a stable equilibrium growth path consistent with
Kaldor’s stylized facts by assuming Harrod-neutral technological progress. However, it is
left to be explained why technical change takes the Harrod-neutral form as well as why
economic forces cause factor shares to be constant in the long-run. Since technical change
is treated exogenously in the Solow-Swan model,7 it cannot explain why long-run

7

With the assumption of competitive factor pricing in neoclassical models, the rate of
technological progress must be exogenous factors since there are no internal resources left for
innovation i.e. all income is distributed as factor remuneration (Tavani and Zamparelli 2017).
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technological progress must be labor-augmenting or why factor shares are constant, other
than the properties of the Cobb-Douglas function. In order to answer the question of why
technical progress is labor-augmenting, we turn to a set of views that treat the bias of
technical change as an endogenous variable.

Kaldor’s Technical Progress Function
According to Nicolas Kaldor, neoclassical models had overlooked the problem of
endogeneity with the relationship between capital accumulation, technical change, and
population growth. Kaldor (1957) developed an alternative model of growth that could
explain the observed long-run average characteristics of growth in advanced capitalist
economies while treating technological change as endogenous. In a system with a positive
rate of capital accumulation, the productivity of capital is limited according to how
“quickly” additional capital can be absorbed for productive use. While historical progress
has been associated with continuous increases in capital intensity, Kaldor states that “no
increase in the amount of waiting per unit of current output, or in the ratio of embodied to
current labour, or in the length of some (arbitrarily measured) investment period” has
occurred (1957, 592). This amounts to saying that over the long-run, the average
productivity of capital does not increase on account of a rising capital intensity.
For Kaldor, technical change is regarded as having a primarily labor-saving bias
since he observed technological progress to increase the productivity of labor inputs but
not of capital inputs (Kaldor 1961; cited in Tavani 2013). The growth rate of labor
productivity depends on the rate of capital accumulation, where an increasing rate of capital
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accumulation induces a greater rate of labor-saving technical innovation (Kaldor 1957).
Instead of using an aggregate production function, the Kaldor growth model expresses the
relationship between capital accumulation and output growth with the concave “technical
progress function.” The technical progress function captures the “state of technological
dynamism” in an economy and gives the rate of technical change induced by additional
capital, where the rate of capital accumulation is reflected in the profitability of new
investment (Brugger and Gehrke 2017). Assuming the technical progress function is
strictly concave means that it becomes more difficult for the economy to absorb additional
capital inputs as the capital intensity increases. In the long-run, the system tends toward
the optimal growth path where the rate of capital accumulation is equal to the rate of output
growth and the capital-output ratio is constant (Kaldor 1957). At this optimal point, the rate
of capital accumulation is sufficient to absorb the rate of technical progress.
The optimal growth path is stable in the sense that adjustments in the direction of
technical change attract the system back toward equilibrium in the event of any exogenous
shocks or perturbations. As long as the rate of capital accumulation rises above the rate of
output growth, then the capital-output ratio will be rising, and the direction of technical
progress adopts a predominantly labor-saving direction. A greater rate of labor-saving
technical change then causes the profit rate to decline, which slows the rate of
accumulation. Conversely, if the rate of capital accumulation is less than the optimal point,
the capital-output ratio will be falling, and the bias of technical progress will be
predominantly capital-saving. A greater rate of capital-saving causes the profitability of
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investments to rise, which increases the rate of accumulation. At the optimal point,
technical progress becomes Hicks-neutral and the profit rate becomes constant.

Induced Innovation Hypothesis
Kaldor’s rejection of neoclassical concepts, such as the aggregate production
function and the elasticity of substitution made his alternative growth model difficult to
integrate within the neoclassical framework. This inspired the need for neoclassical
economists to develop their own theory of induced technical change using standard
concepts (Brugger and Gehrke 2017). The first attempt at such a theory was initiated by
Charles Kennedy’s 1964 article which sought to prove Hicks’ hypothesis that relative
factor prices generate inducement mechanisms which give technical change a certain bias
(factor-saving) against the more expensive factor.
Modeled after Kaldor’s technical progress function, Kennedy introduced the
“invention possibility frontier” relating the rate of capital accumulation and the rate of
output growth as a strictly convex exogenous function given for purely technical, noneconomic factors. Firms are faced with the “choice of directed technical progress”
analogous to the problem of optimal factor substitution (Brugger and Gehrke 2017). Profitmaximizing firms freely choose the profit-maximizing combination of labor- and capitalaugmenting technical change, represented by a single point on the invention possibility
frontier. Technical change can be both labor-augmenting and capital-augmenting in the
sense that firms may reduce the per-unit labor and capital costs. On account of the
convexity assumption, a greater rate of labor-saving technical progress can only be
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obtained at the cost of a lower rate of capital saving or equivalently, a higher rate of capitalusing. Hence, Kennedy’s model describes how firms tend toward the optimal choice of
technical bias that allows higher relative efficiency savings on the more expensive factor.
If per-unit wage costs rose above per-unit capital costs following an increase in the
relative supply of capital, firms will move along the invention possibility frontier to a point
where the rate of labor-saving is higher than the rate of capital-saving. This biased character
of technical change (labor-saving, capital-using) persists until the per-unit factor costs are
equal. In the long-run, the economy tends toward an equilibrium growth path exhibiting
Hick-neutral technical change where factor shares converge to 50-50 equality (Brugger and
Gehrke 2017). In the transitionary period, Kennedy’s model produces a growth path
consistent with labor-augmenting technical progress.

Directed Technical Change
In the long-run, both Kaldor and Kennedy’s models satisfy the long-run facts of
growth, which predict rising wages commensurate with increases in labor productivity.
Recent developments in the neoclassical theory of induced technical change have been
inspired by the “medium-run” problem of falling labor shares. Of primary contribution is
the work of Daron Acemoglu’s theory of “directed” technical change. Acemoglu (2001,
2002a, 2002b) provides a comprehensive framework where profit incentives determine the
amount of resources directed at technical progress biased toward different factors, skills,
or sectors. This theory places Kennedy’s induced innovation hypothesis at its core while
adapting to the critique from Nordhaus (1973) by including microfoundations for directed
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technical change based on standard endogenous growth models (Romer 1990; Grossman
and Helpman 1992; Aghion and Howitt 1992).
The following model describes a multi-sector economy composed of a consumption
goods sector, an intermediate goods sector, and a capital goods sector. Technical progress
is embodied in the production and design of capital goods, being defined as an increase in
the amount of capital goods varieties (Acemoglu 2002a). Demand for capital goods from
the intermediate or consumer goods sectors determine the production choices of capital
goods producers with respect to the design of capital goods and the direction of technical
change. The basic premise of the directed technical change model is that profit incentives
determine the flow of resources toward specific kinds of innovation. Since profit flows are
sensitive to relative factor costs, the determination of bias in the direction of technical
change is directly linked to distributive shares. During the economy’s transition to
equilibrium, a higher labor share (in response to an institutionally-determined wage-push,
for instance) will tend to induce higher rates of labor productivity, which in turn causes the
capital-labor ratio to increase at a higher rate than the ratio of factor prices, leading to a
“corrective” decline in the labor share. In the limit to equilibrium, the long-run bias of
technical progress and the constant factor shares will depend on the elasticity of
substitution between factors.

Wage-Push Induced Capital-Augmenting Technical Change
Consider the quasi-labor supply function: 𝐿 = 𝑚(𝑠& ), where 𝑠& gives the labor share
of income and 𝑚′ > 0. This function describes the supply of labor as a function of the labor
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share instead of the level of the wage. The reasoning for such a function is that, in the longrun, the labor supply must remain roughly constant while the wage rate increases
(Acemoglu 2001). Moreover, the function captures both labor supply decisions and
bargaining between workers and firms. Workers have a weaker bargaining position when
unemployment is high and thus receive a smaller share of output. Accordingly, the function
C

may be specified as 𝐿 = 𝑚(𝑠& ) = (𝜇 C L )1/N , where 𝜏 > 0 with high values corresponding
M

to an inelastic quasi-supply curve and 𝜇 is a shift parameter capturing the “wage-push
shock.” A decrease in 𝜇 corresponds to an increase in the labor share for any given level of
employment (Acemoglu 2001).
For a given bias of technology the ratio of factor shares may be expressed as the
𝑠

function 𝑠 𝐿 = (
𝐾

𝜖

1−𝜎

1−𝛾 − 𝑁𝐾 𝐾
) 𝜎(𝑁 𝐿 ) 𝜎
𝛾
𝐿

, where 𝛾 is a distribution parameter and 𝑁$ , 𝑁& denote the

marginal productivities of capital and labor. This states that when 𝜎 < 1, an increase in the
relative productivity of capital 𝑁$ will raise the labor share. When capital and labor are
substitutes (𝜎 > 1), an increase in the relative productivity 𝑁$ results in a fall of the labor
share. Adjustments in the capital-labor ratio and technological bias ensure that factor shares
converge on to long-run constant values (Acemoglu 2001). Blanchard (1997) shows that
movements in the capital-labor ratio, however, do not empirically explain the behavior of
labor shares since capital-labor ratios rose following the wage-push shock for many
countries (Acemoglu 2001). This implies that adjustment back to equilibrium was driven
mainly by adjustments in the direction of technical change.
A wage-push shock is shown to reduce employment and increase the labor share in
the short-run consistent with the argument in Blanchard (1997) and Caballero and
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Hammour (1998). However, the wage-push shock also affects the equilibrium bias of
technical change. With 𝜎 < 1, firms cannot reduce their labor demand in the short-run in
response to the increasing cost of labor (higher labor share). According to Acemoglu
(2001), however, the change in factor prices increase the profitability of the kind of
technical change that enables firms to become less dependent on labor and induce
innovation in the capital-augmenting direction. Firms reduce their labor demand after
technical change adjusts accordingly. Thus, a decline in 𝜇 further implies a reduction in the
relative productivity of 𝑁$ , corresponding to capital-biased technical change when capital
and labor are complements (Acemoglu 2001). A wage-push first increases the labor share
and then leads to its gradual reduction through the emergence of net capital-augmenting
technical change, with unemployment increasing throughout both stages.

Why is Technical Change Labor-Augmenting in the Long-Run?
Consider the aggregate production function F(L,Z,A) with two inputs, L, labor and
Z, which may represent capital, land, or high-skilled labor, and A gives the technology
index. Acemoglu (2002a) defines the bias of technical change according to its effect on the
ratio of marginal productivities between factors. When the elasticity of substitution is not
equal to one, factor-augmenting technical progress always generates a pattern of bias
against one of the factors. Technical change may be labor-biased or capital-biased
depending on the effect of A on the ratio of marginal productivities of L and Z (Acemoglu
2002).
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The steady increase in the relative supply of capital combined with an elasticity of
substitution below one gives firms the incentive to invest predominantly in laboraugmenting technical change, leading to long-run technical progress to be laboraugmenting but not purely Harrod-neutral. Only by abandoning R&D equipment
specifications for Kennedy’s innovation possibility frontier while allowing for very strong
path dependency does the Acemoglu model achieve a stable long-run equilibrium with
Harrod-neutral technical change with constant factor shares (Brugger and Gehrke 2017).
However, as in the wage-push case, the medium-run direction of technical change may
adopt either a labor-augmenting or capital-augmenting form. Assuming technical progress
is characterized by capital-skill complementarity, the long-run labor share of low-skilled
workers will fall below the labor share of high-skilled workers just as we observed in
Chapter 2.

Induced Skill-Biased Technical Change
In Acemoglu’s model (2002a, 2009), the initial endowment of skill and unskilled
labor determines the intermediate good’s sector demand for different capital goods.
Producers in the capital goods sector make decisions as to the design of capital goods which
may be complementary either to high-skilled labor or low-skilled labor. When capital
goods producers are induced to develop capital goods which are predominately
complementary to skilled labor, then the pattern of technical change that emerges will be
skilled-labor-augmenting. Introducing an increase in the relative supply of skilled labor, as
has occurred in the US since the 1970’s, generates two opposing effects on the relative
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profitability of different kinds of capital goods: a price effect and a market size effect
(Acemoglu 2002a). The price effect reflects the profitability incentive for capital goods
producers to direct resources in a R&D process to produce capital goods variants used to
produce goods commanding a higher price in the intermediate or consumer sector. The
increase in the relative supply of skilled labor reduces the price for skilled labor and the
price of intermediate goods produced with skilled labor inputs. In this case, the price effect
induces the design and production of capital good variants complementary to unskilled
labor. As the price of intermediate goods produced with unskilled labor inputs becomes
relatively more expensive, profit-maximizing capital goods producers move into the design
and production of unskilled labor-complementary capital goods. The market size effect
produces a counteracting effect. An increase in the relative supply of skilled labor expands
the market for capital goods that are complementary to skilled labor, incentivizing also the
design and production of skilled labor-complementary capital goods
Whether one effect dominates the other depends on the elasticity of substitution
between skilled and unskilled labor. When the elasticity of substitution is not equal to one,
factor-augmenting technical progress always generates a pattern of bias. For an elasticity
of substitution greater than one the market size effect dominates generating a pattern of
skilled-augmenting technical change. In this case, skilled labor-augmenting technical
change leads to an increase in the relative marginal productivity of skilled labor which
increases the relative price and demand for skill-labor, and the augmented factor (skilled
labor) is substituted for the non-augmented factor (unskilled labor), describing a pattern of
skill-biased technical change.
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When the elasticity of substitution is less than one, the price effect dominates, and
the emerging pattern of technical progress is unskilled-augmenting. An increase in the
relative supply of skilled labor induces a pattern of unskilled-augmenting technical change
which, for an elasticity of substitution less than one, has a skill-biased pattern (Acemoglu
2002a). Thus, an increase in the relative supply of skilled labor always leads to skill-biased
technical change. Technological progress, independent of the assumed value of the
elasticity of substitution, always generates a skill-biased pattern for an increase in the
relative supply of skilled labor.

Summary of Concepts
A dynamic relationship behind technical change, capital deepening, and
productivity growth may be identified in the standard neoclassical perspective on economic
growth. In particular, the Keynesian instability at the center of the Harrod-Domar system
is “cured” in the Solow-Swan model by allowing for rational factor substitution and
assuming full employment by emphasizing the flexibility of the production frontier in the
long-run.
Exogenous technological progress in the Solow-Swan model holds off the
Ricardian steady-state where the falling marginal productivity of capital runs down the rate
of net investment. However, the landmark finding in Uzawa (1961) shows that a balanced
growth path requires that long-run bias of technical change to be Harrod-neutral. Thus,
extending the Solow-Swan model for purely labor-augmenting progress generates a system
matching Kaldor’s long-run facts of growth where medium-run movements in the labor
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share depend on the elasticity of substitution. However, this model fails to explain why the
bias of technical change must be purely labor-augmenting in the long-run.
The preliminary answers to this question were offered by Nicholas Kaldor and
Charles Kennedy. In Kaldor’s technical progress function, the rate of labor-saving
technological change is induced by the growth rate of capital accumulation. Through
Kennedy’s inventions possibilities frontier, inducements are generated by the choice of
profit-maximizing firms whereby firms optimally choose factor-saving technological
progress on the most expensive factor in production. In the long-run, both Kaldor and
Kennedy’s models satisfy the long-run facts of growth. In the medium-run however, the
problem of falling labor shares has inspired new theoretical work with respect to the
endogenous direction of technical change.
The most developed framework in the neoclassical tradition is Daron Acemoglu’s
theory of directed technical change. Supply and demand considerations in the R&D sector
determine the factor-augmenting bias of technical change, where the elasticity of
substitution determines the long-run bias of technology. While capital-augmenting
technical change is possible during medium-run transition to equilibrium, purely laboraugmenting technical change emerges in the long-run for 𝜎 < 1. Finally, Acemoglu’s
theory of directed technical change may be extended to account for heterogeneous workers.
Supply and demand considerations enter into the potential for skill-biased technical change
through the interaction between the price effect and the market size effect, where for 𝜎 ≠
1, technological progress always exhibits a pattern of skill-bias.
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On the basis of the marginal productivity theory of distribution, the neoclassical
narrative we have covered thus far would conclude that changes in the functional
distribution of income and rising inequality are driven largely by differential gains to
productivity following the impacts of skill-biased technological change. However, it is
important to note that standard full employment growth models are unable to capture the
distribution of rents in the economy due to a lack of a specified agent to collect rents. As
we had discovered in Chapter 2, institutional factors explain a significant portion of the
observed variation in distributional outcomes since the 1970s indicating that wage premia
for high-skilled workers have been inflated above the point that would persist in a
‘competitive equilibrium.’ A sense of realism demands that the standard neoclassical
conclusions not be taken at face value. In light of these facts, it is important also to analyze
the impact of institutional conditions (including social conflict and imperfect competition)
alongside structural change and to better understand the interactions between them.
Beginning with a fundamental critique of neoclassical theory and ending with a review of
institutional shifts in the US, the final two chapters will attempt to provide a more holistic
perspective of the interplay between technological change and institutional change along
these lines.
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Chapter 4: Growth and Distribution with Biased Technical Change

An Alternative Framework
Economists working in the classical-Marxian tradition have developed an
alternative framework for the analysis of economic growth and technical change in
capitalist economies (Michl 1999; Basu 2010; Foley et al. 2019). The motivation for this
framework originates in the classical critique of the aggregate production function in the
debates surrounding the Cambridge Capital Controversy. The UK-Cambridge side of the
debate had been led at the outset by Piero Sraffa and Joan Robinson who pointed out the
difficulty in treating capital, which was a heterogeneous set of goods, as an aggregate
concept. The “puzzle” of aggregation refers to the lack of a specified unit in which the
physical stock of capital equipment is valued in the context of its contribution to aggregate
output.

Capital Aggregation Problem
The specific nature of the aggregate capital stock K in the aggregate production
function had been the center of the Capital Controversy. The neoclassical production
function takes as given the stocks of labor and capital in production as well as the
knowledge for the technical rate of substitution between factors so that their marginal
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productivities may be derived (Robinson 1953). Hence, both the amount of capital and the
rate of profit are related by the technical conditions of production. In J.B. Clark’s (1891)
vision, the principle of differential gain equates the process of production with distribution
such that the factors of production receive income in proportion to their marginal
contributions to national output. This forms the basis of the marginal productivity theory
of distribution. Robinson’s critique is that, for a given period of time, capital as the rate of
return for investments and capital as the sum of finance as uninvested capital (including
net receipts of a firm) do not coexist with each other simultaneously (Robinson 1953). The
value of capital meant for investment cannot be equated with the value of the returns on
capital.
The basis for Robinson’s critique is that it is impossible to relate the quantity of
“capital-in-general” as a stock of value independent of the rate of interest. This
independence is a necessary condition for constructing the iso-quant curve, which shows
the different combinations of two factors (labor and capital) producing a given level of
aggregate output. The construction of such curves is involved in the equations relating the
level of output per worker with the quantity of capital per worker as in the aggregate
production functions of the Solow variety (Solow 1957; Harcourt 1972). The slope of this
iso-quant curve is necessary for determining the relative factor prices in the economy and
the overall distribution of income. Paradoxically, this curve cannot be constructed, and its
slope cannot be determined without the equilibrium factor prices being known (Harcourt
1972). Hence the notion of profits as a value measure of capital is tautological: the value
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of capital cannot be known without determining equilibrium factor prices, which depend
on knowing the value of capital.
The position of Sraffa and Robinson was that it was infeasible to regard the rate of
profit as the reward for the productive contributions of capital. Without an adequate
measure of value, the aggregate stock of capital was considered inappropriate for use in
analyzing a system of production, with capital as a productive input, and a system of
distribution where the private ownership of capital entitles a share of national income as
profits (Harcourt 1972). In developing an alternative vision of growth, the UK-Cambridge
economists argued that the factor price system does not determine the functional
distribution of income (Rima 2002). Factor prices and their distributive shares are
considered the outcome of institutional forces and arrangements in capitalism. Under the
private ownership of capital, capitalists are entitled to a flow of profits as the return on
invested capital. The profit rate depends on the production of ‘surplus value’ as in the
Marxian tradition. The wage rate and thus the labor share are determined as outcomes of
social conflict between capitalists and the working classes, and may be mediated by social
(efficiency wages, collective bargaining) and institutional (policy, market structure) forces.

Growth-Distribution Schedule
In emphasis of social conflict, classical-Marxian analysis rejects the use of smooth
and continuously differentiable aggregate production functions, starting instead from the
growth-distribution (GD) schedule (Basu 2010). The GD schedule perceives growth as a
process of capital accumulation characterized by two fundamental trade-offs: the social
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consumption-growth rate relation and the real wage-profit rate relation. Output is produced
using labor and capital goods, taken as homogenous under competitive conditions.8
Additionally, the production function is interpreted as a technological history of the
economy, rather than a static set of production techniques as in neoclassical theory (Michl
1999).
The social consumption-growth rate relation represents the distribution of national
output to be allocated for internal social consumption and for investment as accumulated
capital. As in the standard growth models, the accumulation of capital is a necessary
component of economic growth. The GD schedule emphasizes however that economic
systems face a trade-off between the social consumption of output and capital investment
to provide for future consumption, where consumption and gross investment are measured
in per-worker terms. Drawing from Foley et al. (2019), the social consumption-growth rate
schedule may be written as 𝑐 = 𝑥 − (𝑔$ + 𝛿)𝑘, where c is social consumption per worker,
x is labor productivity, 𝑔$ is the growth rate of the capital stock, 𝛿 is the rate of capital
stock depreciation, and k is the quantity of capital per worker.
Capitalist economies also face the trade-off of the distribution of output between
the two fundamental social classes: workers and capitalists. The real wage-profit rate
relation gives the distribution of value added in national output as remuneration for wages
and net profits. The total sum of wages may be regarded as the output left over after
capitalists’ receipt of profits (Foley et al. 2019). The real wage-profit rate relation then may

8

In this sense, the aggregate stock of capital is said to assume a “putty-like” characteristic (Basu
2010).
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be written in per-worker terms as 𝑤 = 𝑥 − 𝑘𝑣, where w is the total wage bill per worker
(the wage rate) and v is the gross rate of profit. This shows the relationship between wages
and the profit rate for a given level of capital intensity and capital productivity. When real
wages are equal to output per worker 𝑤 = 𝑥, the profit rate falls to zero, which gives a net
profit rate of 𝑟 = −𝛿 (Foley et al. 2019). Hence, the possibility of capital accumulation
requires that the wage is always less than the marginal product of labor. Accordingly, the
movement of factor shares is viewed as an outcome of class conflict.

Figure 7: Growth-Distribution Schedule

Source: Reproduced from Basu (2009)

Comparing the two fundamental relations reveal that both equations depend on the
variables k, x, and, 𝛿. Hence the same technical conditions form the basis for either relation
allowing for them to be combined to form the GD schedule for the economy. The GD
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schedule is drawn as a negatively sloped straight line on a graph represented in 𝑣 − 𝑤 space
or in (𝑔$ + 𝛿) − 𝑐 space as shown in Figure 7. The GD schedule is representative of the
‘best-practice’ technological frontier in an economy for a given period (Basu 2010).
Technical change in the GD schedule is represented by changes in x and p, which
correspond graphically to shifts of the GD schedule along the axes. The slope of the GD
schedule measures the capital intensity of production k=x/p, determined by the choice of
production technique given as the ordered pair (x, p).

Marx-Biased Technical Change
The process of capitalist growth in real economies has been characterized by
secular accumulations of capital per worker accompanied by steady increases in the
productivity of labor. This process has also been accompanied by declines in the
productivity of capital, as measured by the output-capital ratio, over significant lengths of
time. Foley et al. (2019) document that in the US, the periods from 1820-1913 and 19731992 have seen consistent spans of declining capital productivity; in between these two
periods however was a period of rising capital productivity. Similarly, Japan experienced
two major periods of declining capital productivity from 1870-1950 and 1973-1992 with a
period of rising capital productivity in between.
The phenomena of steady increases in the productivity of labor accompanied by a
falling productivity of capital observed in advanced capitalist economies is consistent with
a pattern of technical change that is labor-saving and capital-using. Hence, this pattern of
technical bias is described by a positive rate of labor productivity growth 𝛾 > 0 and a
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negative rate of capital productivity growth 𝜒 < 0. This is known as Marx-biased technical
Change (MBTC) since it is consistent with a falling rate of profit over time.
A falling capital productivity is an outcome of capitalist development leading to
more capital-intensive production methods over time. Continuous increases in the capitallabor ratio (or the organic composition of capital in Marxian terms) occupies a central place
in the classical-Marxian analysis. The internal dynamism in capitalism is driven by the
development of productive forces through conflict-driven innovation and technical change.
The inducement for the introduction of advanced capital (i.e. machines, computers) by
individual capitalists is the drive to expand the production of surplus value from which
profits are derived (Foley 2003). The accumulation of capital and the innovation of new,
capital-intensive techniques expands the production of surplus value by augmenting the
productive capacity of labor within the working day. However, additional profits from
technological change for the individual capitalist are temporary until efficiency gains from
new production methods are diffused throughout the rest of the sector or industry.
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Figure 8: Marx-Biased Technical Change

Source: Extended Penn World Tables V 4.0

Output per worker grows steadily as the amount of capital per worker increases,
while the overall productivity of capital falls when the capital-intensity of production
increases at a faster rate than the actual rate of capital productivity (Foley et al. 2019). In
the long-run, the adoption of net labor-augmenting technical change tends to drive down
the average profit rate of the economy. Figure 8 depicts this pattern for five advanced
economies over the period 1963-2010, showing modest but typically significant declines
in capital productivity and the average profit rate since the mid 1960’s.
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A falling capital productivity, when coupled with a constant wage share, tends
toward a reduction in the rate of profit, which according to the GD schedule, leads to a
slowdown in the rate of accumulation and the growth of output. This pattern cannot go on
indefinitely. Ceteris paribus, the rate of profit would eventually fall to a point that economic
growth comes to a halt. Economies in actual experience have never reached this point since
periods characterized by MBTC do not last indefinitely and are eventually broken by
periods of stable or rising capital productivity (Foley et al. 2019).
When the profit rate falls beyond a critical threshold firms must eventually engage
in technical change that is capital-augmenting and labor-using, which leads to stagnant or
declining labor productivity growth. This was observed during the 1980’s and into the
1990’s for the US, a period identified by a temporary increase in capital productivity and
slow-down in labor productivity growth following the “wage-push shock” discussed in
earlier chapters. By around the 1980’s, the decline in profit rates slowed (US, UK) or even
reversed (France, Germany, Japan) for the countries sampled, exhibiting significant
variation in the medium-run thereafter. These trends have largely persisted into the 2000s
despite the growth of labor productivity having picked up thereafter accompanied by steady
declines in capital productivity (Chen 2017).
While this overall slowdown in profit rate declines and their cross-country variation
reflect in part an increased rate of capital-augmenting technical change, it is also possible
that institutional factors are at play. The emerging variation in profit rate trends since the
1980’s coincides with the ascendance and consolidation of the neoliberal paradigm in
national policy-making, characterized by some commentators as a major a break in the
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post-war balance of power between capital and labor (Harvey 2005). Since 2000, it appears
as though profit rates in the US have slowed only marginally since the 1980’s and have
even increased for Japan and Germany. Judging by the labor productivity growth trends in
Figure 8, the shift in capital-augmenting technology during the 1980’s had not been
sustained enough to have constituted a significant break in MBTC across the five advanced
economies. In the next chapter, we will discover an additional means of slowing down the
declining rate of profit: a shift in institutional conditions favoring the interests of capital
over labor. But first, let us clear up some theoretical points as to the determination of the
direction of technical change in the classical-Marxian framework.

Why Does Marx-Biased Technical Change Emerge?
Foley et al. (2019) identify two forms in which MBTC emerges. The first case
specifies the pattern of MBTC as arising exogenously as an outcome of historical periods
of class conflict. The argument is that technical change may carry an inherent bias toward
the substitution of labor as a reflection of class division in the social relations of capitalist
production and the drive toward the expansion of surplus value. In effect, the process of
capitalist development is characterized by the mechanization and automation of production
overtime.
In the second case, MBTC may be explained endogenously as the response of
capitalist firms to economic incentives. The essence of the theory of induced technical
change is that capitalist firms have an incentive to ‘economize’ on the factor in which the
share of total production costs is high. For a labor share that is relatively high, firms will
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be induced to search for labor-saving innovations and adopt new production techniques in
this direction. If the growth rates of labor and capital productivity depend on relative factor
shares, then there is a feedback mechanism which links increases in productivity to
distributive shares. If the wage share rises, the rate of labor productivity may also rise,
tending toward a reduction in the demand for labor and generating downward pressure on
real wages.
For Foley (2003), such a feedback mechanism may act as a “social thermostat”
which stabilizes the long-run labor share at the level in which the induced increase in
capital productivity is close to zero. This provides a necessary condition for a stable
relationship between capital accumulation and the growth of the labor force. The following
section discusses how the pattern of MBTC may be endogenized by using the induced
innovation hypothesis advanced by Kennedy (1964) combined with a Goodwin growth
model to explore movements in the labor share. The exploration of such models is
particularly relevant since we avoid the limitations of equilibrium analysis and afford a
more explicit consideration of the importance of the institutionally determined nature of
wages and the bargaining power of workers.

Income Distribution in the Classical Tradition
In contemporary terms, the classical-Marxian perspective of capital and distribution
is deeply influenced by the general equilibrium model of Sraffa (1960). Sraffa’s general
equilibrium model with full employment has 𝑛 known commodity outputs and 𝑛 − 1
unknown prices, expressed in terms of a numeraire good. Outputs are produced by a given
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level of the labor supply, receiving an unknown average wage rate w. Similarly, non-labor
factors receive an unknown rate of return (profit) r. The economy is represented by a
system of input-output relations linked according to technical conditions. This gives n
equations relating each output to its set of inputs and an aggregated equation for national
income expressing the sum of outputs (Rima 2002).
In the Sraffian model, commodities are both outputs and inputs in the means of
production. Thus, the price of each commodity in the system is linked so that relative prices
must be determined simultaneously to close the model. The prevailing rate of profit may
be derived as long as commodity prices are given (Rima 2002). Once the rate of profit is
known wages are determined as the distributive residual. However, capital is not an original
factor of production.9 Rather, capital goods are the product of a previous stage of
production, to be used as an input for subsequent stages of production (Rima 2002).
Sraffa’s model shows that the problem of distribution cannot be solved theoretically
unless the system of input-output equations is closed by assuming an institutionally
established wage level 𝑤. The wage bargain is not regarded as an agreement between
capitalist firms and workers to divide revenues according to the marginal products of labor
and capital. Following Marx, labor is understood to exchange control over labor-power for
a given period of time in return for a socially-determined wage rate that is independent of
capitalists' revenue gains (Foley 2003). Accordingly, there is no economic reason to
assume that workers are automatically rewarded for higher productivity with higher wages.
This explanation is opposed to the neoclassical view that wage increases consistent with
9

Capital is not “original” in the sense that it lacks the “timeless” quality of capital in the
neoclassical production functions (Michl, 1999)
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productivity are mediated by full employment or conditions of labor scarcity in general.
The classical tradition takes as given the wage level rather than the supply of labor, thus
recognizing the role of institutional and political factors in contributing to the
determination of wage levels. According to Foley (2003), the actual historical experience
of wages rising roughly with the rate of labor productivity can be explained on the basis of
three social-institutional mechanisms: 1) the tendency for minimum standards of living and
labor force reproduction to increase with technology, 2) the political tendency of workers
to organize into labor unions and exert collective bargaining power to secure a proportion
of productivity gains for wages, and 3) with the continuous accumulation of the capital
stock constantly outrunning the effective supply of labor, wages must rise in order to absorb
the excess demand for labor.
These social mechanisms generally interact in self-reinforcing ways. For an
economy in a period of expansion, tight labor markets will provide favorable ground for
union formation and collective bargaining. An increase in unionization creates upward
pressure on social expectations around the standard of living. Social pressures may
eventually result in real wage growth faster than the growth of productivity, leading to an
increase in the labor share. A slowdown in the rate of capital accumulation leads to
weakening labor demand, leading to higher unemployment. Accordingly, an increase in
the labor share tends to be self-limiting through the inevitable weakening of labor demand.
Moreover, an increase in the labor share induces a faster rate of growth in the productivity
of labor, causing additional unemployment from labor-saving, which replenishes the

72

reserve army of labor. Beyond a certain threshold, employment trends from the demand
for labor move in reverse to correct a prolonged fall in the labor share.

Goodwin Growth Cycles
These social dynamics of advanced capitalist economies are formalized in Richard
Goodwin’s (1967) dynamic growth cycle model based on predator-prey interaction in
ecological models. Goodwin combines a model of capital accumulation and the labor
market centered on the mutual feedback between wages, the profit rate, and the demand
for labor. At the core of the model is the distributional conflict between capital and labor,
which generates endogenous cycles in employment and the labor share. The logic of the
Goodwin model follows the “symbiotic contradictions” of capitalism whereby workers and
capitalists in society depend on each other for livelihood, while at the same time, exist in
conflict over their respective shares in the national income. Consequent expansions in
output and employment following a period of high profitability will inevitably exhaust the
ranks of the industrial reserve army and improve the bargaining power of labor. In the same
way that over predation causes the collapse of both populations of predator and prey, “a
rate of profit that is too high sows the seeds of its own decline” (van der Ploeg 1987).
The main variables in the Goodwin model are the labor share (predator) and the
employment rate (prey). These variables interact outside of a balanced growth path
meaning that wages and labor productivity may grow at different rates. Drawing from
Foley (2003), where N denotes total employment and L denotes the potential labor force,
the Goodwin model assumes that the rate of change in the wage per worker will be
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proportional to the excess of the employment rate 𝑒 = 𝑁/𝐿 over an institutionally given
level 𝑒0 , at which the real wage does not change. Expressing the growth rate of the wage
level as the percentage change over the initial wage and 𝛿 as the factor of proportionality,
the relationship between wages and employment is written as 𝑤
Y = 𝛿(𝑒 − 𝑒0 ).
The average profit rate 𝑟 in the economy is the ratio of profits (output minus wages,
X−W) to the value of the accumulated capital stock 𝐾. The labor share represents the ratio
of wages to output 𝜔 = 𝑊/𝑋, the productivity of labor is denoted as x=X/N, and the
productivity of capital is denoted as p=X/K. The profit rate may then be expressed as: 𝑟 =
]^_
$

1

= (1 − ` )𝑝 = (1 − 𝜔)𝑝. Since the profit rate is defined as 𝑟 = (1 − 𝜔)𝑝, a fall in

the productivity of capital holding the wage share constant results in a lower profit rate.
This highlights the Marxian view of the tendency for the profit rate to fall with capital
accumulation and technical progress over time and represents in our case, historical periods
characterized by MBTC.
For a given productivity of labor and the productivity of capital, the long-run level
of employment will be proportional to the capital stock 𝑁 = (𝑝/𝑥)𝐾. If the productivity of
labor and capital are growing at constant rates, 𝑥a = 𝛾 and 𝑝̂ = 𝜒, then the rate of
c=𝐾
c + 𝜒 − 𝛾. If the
employment growth will be function of productivity growth: 𝑁
potential labor force grows at rate 𝐿d = 𝑛, the employment ratio can be expressed as a
c − 𝐿d which is
function of productivity growth, the profit rate, and the labor share: 𝑒̂ = 𝑁
equivalent to 𝑒̂ = (1 − 𝜔)𝑝 − 𝛽 + 𝜒 − 𝛾 − 𝑛.
The equations for the growth of wages 𝑤
Y and employment 𝑒̂ constitute a twodimensional dynamic system in which (𝑒, 𝑤) exhibit paths of fluctuating growth cycles
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(Foley 2003). Supposing that economic output is expanding and employment increasing, a
higher labor demand generates upward pressure on wages. As long as real wages are rising
faster than the growth of labor productivity, the labor share of income will rise. Since
workers are assumed to not save (all income is spent), an increase in the labor share implies
that the resultant decrease in the profit share will directly lead to reduced investment and
output in the next period. With the economy in a depressed state, labor demand will fall
and lead to a reduction in the rate of wage inflation or wage deflation depending on the
magnitude of decline. As long as the growth of wages falls below the growth of labor
productivity, the labor share will decrease.
In turn, an increase in the profit share translates into further investment and output
growth and a period of expansion leads to a tightening of the labor market, increasing the
real wage and lowering the profit rate. Eventually, a depressed labor market comes to
undermine the bargaining power of workers and results in a falling labor share, which
begins the cycle again as profits rise and output and labor demand improve. Assuming a
given rate of Harrod-neutral technical progress generates perfect long-run symmetry
between the bargaining position of workers and firms and their distributive shares (Foley
et al. 2019). As a result, the economy never reaches an equilibrium growth path but
oscillates perpetually in a limit cycle and the conflict of distribution is never settled.

Induced Technical Change in a Kennedy-Goodwin Model
Political economists have combined growth cycle models with induced technical
change in order to analyze the relation between movements in factor shares and the labor75

augmenting bias of technical change (Shah and Desai 1985; van der Ploeg 1987; Foley
2003). Wages and profit rates are exogenous variables in Kennedy’s (1964) induced
technical change model. In contrast, Goodwin (1967) developed a model of growth cycles
in which labor share and the profit rate are determined endogenously. However, the original
Goodwin model assumed technical change as an exogenously given constant.
Kennedy’s induced innovation hypothesis states that the typical capitalist firm faces
an “innovation possibilities frontier” relating a given level of investment in innovation with
the trade-off between the rate of growth of labor productivity and the rate of growth of
capital productivity (Foley 2003). In the Kennedy-Goodwin model, firms are faced with a
set of possible technical changes, represented in the invention possibilities frontier 𝛾 =
𝑓(𝜒), which describes a curve concave to the origin. The invention possibilities frontier
defines a menu of many possible configurations of technical change plotted on a graph
where the vertical axis represents the growth of labor productivity 𝛾,and the horizontal axis
gives the growth of capital productivity 𝜒. A point along the frontier describes a
configuration of MBTC where there is a positive rate of labor-saving and capital-using.
The concavity of the invention possibilities function expresses diminishing returns in that
greater rates of labor-saving can be pursued at the expense of proportionately larger rates
of dis-saving in capital. Hence, labor-saving innovations generally come at the expense of
low or negative rates of capital-saving.
The Kennedy-Goodwin model laid out originally in Shah and Desai (1985)
specifies an economy in which output is given as a single commodity that can either be
consumed by workers or invested in the capital stock by capitalist firms. Extending the
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Goodwin model with induced technical change makes labor productivity and capital
productivity endogenously determined variables. Profit-maximizing firms seek to reduce
the cost of producing one unit of output for a given wage and interest rate. Assuming a
competitive environment, the firm starts with an initial profit rate equal to the average profit
rate. Capitalist firms take the profit share 𝜋 as given and optimally choose the rate of capital
productivity growth 𝜒 to maximize the rate of cost reduction constrained by the
technological progress function. The growth rate of capital productivity will be increasing
in the profit share, which implies that the growth rate of labor productivity will be
increasing in the wage share. Hence, the growth rate of labor productivity will decrease
with the profit share and increase with the wage share.
In the Kennedy-Goodwin model, unlike the original model, capitalists learn from
history in the sense that they are sensitive to relative factor costs (Shah and Desai 1985).
Profits are invested in developing new technologies which will be cost-minimizing. While
traditional Goodwin cycles are characterized by perpetual movement around an
equilibrium, modifying the system to allow capitalist firms to choose the cost-minimizing
direction of technical change causes the economy to converge to a locally stable
equilibrium point in a cyclical pattern (Shah and Desai 1985; van der Ploeg 1987). With
induced technical change, capitalist firms do not passively accept rising real wages. For an
increase in the labor share as a result of economic expansion or increases in workers’
bargaining power, firms will invest in developing more labor-saving production
techniques. In this sense, induced technical change breaks the symmetry of bargaining
power that produced the Goodwin growth cycle (Foley et al. 2019).
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The distributional conflict is settled in the long-run with the economy eventually
converging to a balanced growth path with constant factor shares, a constant rate of
employment, and a pattern of Harrod-neutral technical progress. As long as the direction
of technical change is variable, any small deviation from equilibrium enables capitalists to
erase any labor share gains made by workers by sufficiently increasing the rate of labor
productivity. The long-run equilibrium is stable since the economy returns to its
equilibrium position as long as capitalists can choose the optimal combination of technical
change. Without any further specification, the model assumes that workers passively accept
the capitalists’ choice of production technology. The local stability result is generated by
allowing an additional degree of freedom for class conflict for capitalists but not for
workers. The equilibria of Goodwin growth cycles with induced technical change are
sensitive to initial conditions. Variations in workers’ bargaining power have implications
for the long-run growth path. A higher initial level of bargaining power is associated with
a higher long-run labor productivity and a lower long-run employment level (Tavani 2013).

Concluding Remarks on Kennedy-Goodwin Growth Cycles
The symmetric bargaining position assumed at the core of the original Goodwin
model produces the characteristic perpetual “orbits” around the equilibrium. Extending the
model to include induced innovation introduces ‘stabilizer mechanisms’ causing it to
converge to a steady-state point in a cyclical convergence path. The privilege of capitalists’
choice in the cost-minimizing direction of technical change offers an additional weapon
over labor in class conflict. The bargaining asymmetry introduced by induced innovation
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leads to a long-run equilibrium where factor shares are constant but asymmetric (in favor
of capital) and technical change is purely labor-augmenting in the limit.
Embedding the induced innovation hypothesis to the Goodwin model adds a
historical perspective to the emergence of periods characterized as MBTC. Capitalists
effectively “learn from history” in responding to profit incentives to secure the optimal
path of technical change (Basu 2010). As labor tends toward the more expensive factor in
advanced economies we find long-run trends toward “capital-using” and the growth of
labor productivity, often by means of mechanization and automation. In Marxian terms,
this increase in constant capital relative to variable capital reflects in large part the labor
displacement trends identified in Chapter 2. However, as the productivity of capital
declines over time so does the rate of profit, which eventually threatens the possibility of
accumulation. Thus, the declining rate of capital productivity in periods characterized by
MBTC do not last indefinitely. However, a falling capital productivity need not lead to a
falling rate of profit if there is a simultaneous decline in the labor share and rise in the profit
share. There is the possibility and incentive for capitalists engaging in MBTC to leverage
institutional factors to force a decline in the labor share.
Institutional factors may affect distributional outcomes and also alter the direction
of technical change. Assuming pro-capital institutional shifts lead to a decline in the labor
share farther than would have occurred under induced innovation, then the tendency of the
profit rate to fall with MBTC may be slowed. This allows capitalists to continue to invest
in labor-augmenting technical change and undermine the labor share further. I argue this
possibility is entirely consistent with contemporary accounts of the rise of neoliberalism
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(Harvey 2005). The next chapter will examine a market power-bargaining power
framework from which to analyze the declining labor shares in the context of recent
political developments and institutional shifts in the US and their impact on the bargaining
position of workers.
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Chapter 5: Market Structure, Institutional Shifts, and Bargaining
Power Declines

Institutions and Inequality
The case for the role of institutions in shaping the distribution of income starts with
the observation that cross-country variation in inequality is not well-explained by measures
of globalization and technological change. Compared to many OECD countries that have
similar levels of technological development, government structure, and levels of trade
integration, the US stands out in recent decades as an outlier with stagnant real wages for
the average worker, falling real wages for less-skilled workers, and rising wage inequality
overall (Blau and Kahn 1999).
We can view institutions as playing a role in mediating the impact of market forces
through compensation and redistribution. With respect to globalization, some of the most
globalized countries, measured in terms of trade openness, are also the most equal (i.e.
Scandinavia and Continental Europe) while some of the least trade-open countries have
relatively high levels of inequality (US and Latin America). In the case of Scandinavia and
Continental Europe, trade openness and the impacts of automation and structural change
have been linked to compensation/redistribution mechanisms that reduce after-tax
inequality (Ventura 2006). The reduction of income inequality in European countries
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in general, is partly driven by more redistributive measures to compensate for
market inequality (Alvaredo et al. 2013). European countries appear to have a higher
commitment to labor market spending (both passive and active) as well as other automatic
stabilizers for trade exposure and structural change (Blau and Kahn 1999; Kharlamova et
al. 2018). In contrast, the US and the similar anglosphere economies have seen a process
of welfare state retrenchment and privatization of public goods coupled with relatively
weaker compensation/redistribution mechanisms, which some authors have linked to a
decline in the “social wage” (Harvey 2005). The notion of the social wage is based on
findings that the development of redistribution policy and active labor market policy relate
highly to matters of ‘cultural acceptability’ (Williamson 2002).
While the income shares of the top 1% in Continental European countries and Japan
have seen very little change after the 1950’s, the US and the UK appear as relative outliers
showing substantial increases of the top 1% income shares starting around the 1970’s
(Alvaredo et al. 2013), coinciding also with the deregulation of labor markets and the
expansion of financial markets. Cross-country variation in inequality is therefore explained
largely by the diversity of policy adjustments (or lack thereof) that different countries have
used to respond to domestic market inequality.
It is possible also to consider institutions as playing a role in shaping how markets
themselves respond to market forces. To test for the significance of institutional forces in
driving the distributional impacts of market forces this section considers whether
technology-driven labor market transformations are sufficient to provide a full account for
the disruption in the relationship between productivity growth and labor compensation.
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Stansbury and Summers (2018) offer two points of empirical evidence to the contrary. In
their time series analysis of co-movements in productivity and labor compensation for the
period 1973-2016, they find that strong statistical linkages remain between productivity
increases and labor compensation for the average worker and for production, nonsupervisory workers. Additionally, they find little evidence of a significant negative
relationship between changes in productivity (as a proxy for biased technical change) and
changes in the labor share, except since 2000, the period corresponding to the greatest level
of labor-displacement (Autor and Salomans 2018). The impacts of technological change,
on their own, do not appear to have substantially weakened the relationship between higher
productivity and labor compensation.
These results, while not entirely capable of minimizing the distributional impacts
of technological change, do suggest that standard neoclassical explanations based on factor
substitution and biased technical change cannot provide a full picture for declining labor
shares and rising wage inequality. Accounting for the observed decoupling between
productivity and compensation growth must turn to factors “orthogonal” or unrelated to
productivity growth (Stansbury and Summers 2018). This chapter is dedicated to a critical
discussion of these “orthogonal” factors in the US. Particularly important is the distribution
of market power between firms, workers, and in contemporary capitalism, corporate
shareholders.
One difficulty to keep in mind with the preceding discussion of institutional factors
is the common issue of endogeneity with respect to structural factors. There are clear
plausible linkages between technologically-driven structural change and changes in the
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distribution of market power to keep in mind. For instance, assuming high productivity
firms operating with relatively high elasticities of substitution capture large portions of
market share overtime, then the rising concentration of the market may lead to increased
market power in addition to firm-level declines in the labor share. Secondly, given that the
manufacturing sector has traditionally formed the basis of union organizing in the US, steep
declines in manufacturing are inextricable from the weakening of unions and union
coverage. The transition from manufacturing to services presents a significant barrier to
any re-consolidation of union given the inherent difficulties in organizing across largely
heterogeneous service sector firms.
Despite these difficulties, researchers have brought evidence to light suggesting
that institutional and policy shifts have altered the structure of wage determination between
workers and firms, leading to an overall decline in the ability of the typical worker to
benefit from increases in productivity. This is particularly true for workers at the bottom
end of the wage distribution who face an erosion of living standards as the growth of
median hourly compensation barely keeps pace with inflation (Pierce 2020). In contrast, it
would appear that a larger portion of returns to productivity growth have accrued to
workers earning the highest wages. Hourly compensation growth for wage earners at the
top 10th percentile is observed to have kept pace with the growth of average productivity
over the same period. What’s more, the top 1 percent of wage earners have enjoyed massive
increases in income partly driven by large cumulative gains in wage and non-wage labor
compensation well in excess of productivity growth (Bivens et al. 2014).
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The following section considers a market power framework which departs from the
standard neoclassical accounts by accounting for imperfect competition and the extraction
of rents in both product and labor markets. The framework centers on an imperfectly
competitive economy with three types of power: monopoly power, monopsony power, and
worker power. The extraction of rents by firms and the bargaining power of workers have
significant implications for the functional distribution of income.

A Market Power Framework
Monopoly power refers to the power of firms in product markets to extract rents by
setting a markup on output prices over their marginal cost. Firms derive market power from
the various elements of monopolistic competition including explicit barriers to entry (due
to regulatory barriers or economies of scale), collusive behavior and cartel-formation,
heterogeneous production techniques, and the presence of fixed costs in the short-run
(Stansbury and Summer 2020).
Where monopoly refers to markets in which there is one seller, monopsony refers
to markets with one buyer, and in the tradition of Robinson (1933), typically references the
labor market. Monopsony power refers to the degree of firms’ power in the labor market
where rents are extracted by “marking-down'' individual wages under the marginal product
of labor. The classic example of a monopsony is the company town in which there is only
one employer. Without competitive pressures from other firms, the sole employer leverages
a degree of wage-setting power to offer wages at less than the marginal product of labor.
In theory, perfectly competitive labor markets will drive the elasticity of labor supply
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toward infinity, denoting a frictionless environment in which workers may effortlessly
move between abundant employers in search of higher wages. The lack of upward pressure
on wages derives from the fact that workers facing a monopsony are unable to find
alternative, better paying work without high costs of relocation. The classic source of
monopsony power is market concentration and collusion between firms.
Search-and-matching models10 of the labor market provide a more generalized view
of monopsony power where the implicit and explicit costs of seeking employment and
switching to new employment yield a degree of leverage employed by firms in setting
wages. These costs arise from a large number of factors that derive from the notion that
workers are heterogenous agents - in terms of skill-sets, mobility and relocation costs,
availability of information, employment and location preferences, etc. The cost of these
search frictions yields a degree of leverage for firms such that they may face a relatively
inelastic labor supply. Search models enable us to perceive “company towns of a different
form” as in the market for nurses and school teachers, or that of rural areas where
employment is dominated by single firms or industries (Naidu et al. 2018).
The countervailing force to the monopoly-monopsony power of firms lies in the
bargaining power of workers, also referred to as “worker power.” This refers to the ability
of individual workers to extract “pseudo-rents'' or raise their labor compensation above the
level that would normally prevail in the monopsonistically-set wage equilibrium
(Stansbury and Summers 2020). Based on the Nash wage bargain explicit in search-andmatching models, workers’ bargaining power reflects their capacity to share in the rents

10

See Mortenson and Pissarides (1994); Burdett and Mortenson (1998); Rogerson et al. (2005)
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generated by firms operating in imperfectly competitive product markets. Worker power is
particularly augmented by collective bargaining strategies and greater wage centralization
under labor unions. The strength of unions provided a countervailing force against
monopsony power by helping secure greater standardization of work requirements, making
jobs more interchangeable in terms of standard terms of employment and benefits, and
reducing the relative costs of quitting (Naidu et al. 2018). More generally, workers also
derive bargaining power from matching frictions and turnover costs due to unique or
acquired firm-specific skills as well as the value of their outside option, which includes
policy supports like unemployment benefits and the minimum wage.

Monopoly Power
De Loecker and Eeckhout (2017) document the evolution of markups in the US
since 1950 using firm-level data to estimate an empirical measure of markups. Their
measure of markups is the wedge between the expenditure share of revenue of a producer’s
variable inputs and the output elasticity of those inputs. Their approach shows that average
firm-level markups were stable from 1950 until beginning a steep rise after 1980,
increasing from 18% above marginal costs to 67% by 2014. While there is no universal
pattern of rapidly rising markups across industries, markups tend to be higher across all
sectors of the US economy while the major portion of the average increase is explained on
account of within-industry increases. In theory, an increase in monopoly power will tend
to raise the level of profit and has significant implications for factor shares and rising
inequality. Higher profits from rents will tend to increase the capital share of income,
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lowering the labor share and increasing income inequality in general, since equity holders
(shareholders and other claimants to corporate profits) tend to be concentrated in the upper
levels of the income distribution (Eggertson et al. 2018).
However, rising markups do not automatically indicate higher profits are being
derived from market power. Technological progress may lead to higher markups when it
reduces variable costs while increasing fixed costs. Technological progress as such would
lead to higher markups since variable costs have fallen while preventing output prices from
dropping since firms still need to cover fixed costs. Accounting for these considerations,
De Loecker and Eeckhout show that a weighted average of corporate dividends (as a
measure of firm-level profits) tracks closely with the evolution of markups, both following
substantial increases since 1980. These results suggest that individual firms with higher
markups tend to have higher dividend margins, which indicates that higher markups are
not driven exclusively by technological change and may be explained as a result of changes
in market competition leading to greater market power for firms.
Autor et al. (2017) focus on the asymmetric impact on labor shares due to a minority
of large “superstar firms” who capture large portions of market share through increasing
returns. They argue that key industries are increasingly characterized by “winner take
most” behavior in which one or a handful of highly successful firms capture a very large
share of the market. In theoretical terms, large firms exhibit lower firm-level labor shares
whenever production requires a fixed amount of overhead labor in addition to a sizedependent variable labor input so that firms’ share of fixed costs in total revenue declines
as they grow large or when monopoly markups correlate positively with firm size.
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Empirically, the authors have found consistently upward trends in sales concentration
across major US sectors including manufacturing, finance, and services, indicating the rise
of large, high-productivity firms with lower labor shares. When superstar firms capture
large market shares of a sector, the sector tends to see a reduction in the overall labor share,
with the most concentrated sectors being associated with the large declines (Autor et al.
2017).

Monopsony Power
In real economies, labor markets are somewhere in between pure monopsony and
perfect competition, a position characterized by degrees of “imperfect competition.” The
degree of monopsony power of a firm reflects the proximity of the elasticity of labor supply
to 0; where, for an elasticity below 1, the labor supply is considered inelastic and labor
markets are highly monopsonistic. Webber (2015) provides direct firm-level evidence
between the elasticity of labor supply for a firm and the earnings of its workers. Hence,
this characteristic of many actual labor markets enables firms to leverage monopsony
power to set wages below workers’ marginal product. The degree to which wages are
suppressed as an outcome of monopsony power depends on a number of factors.
The standard culprit is market concentration. A recent landmark study from Azar
et al. (2017) documents a marked increase in industrial concentration in the US using data
from a leading employment website. Using the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) to
calculate levels of market concentration and comparing them to a key antitrust horizontal
merger guidelines threshold, they find that the average labor market in the US is highly
89

concentrated with an average HHI of 3,157, well above the official “high concentration”
threshold HHI of 2,500. The level of concentration varies widely by city and occupation,
though Azar et al. are able to show a significant negative relationship between city size and
the level of concentration.
Azar et al. (2017) establish a significant negative relationship between labor market
concentration and the average posted wages for a given market, indicating that firms
operating in more concentrated markets do in fact leverage a higher degree of monopsony
power to hold down wages. This finding is replicated in Benmelech et al. (2018), who
document a moderate increase in plant-level HHI measures of concentration in
manufacturing industries for the US. Their main findings conclude that the relationship
between productivity growth and average labor compensation growth tend to be disrupted
when labor markets are more concentrated. What’s more labor markets exhibiting higher
degrees of concentration tend to be those facing greater exposure to import competition
from China (Benmelech et al. 2018), implying a connection between import exposure and
market concentration via firm exit.
Aside from concentrated labor markets, firms derive monopsony power when
powerful firms cooperate through anti-competitive agreements, thus engaging in collusion
to drive down wages. Leaked documents reported by journalist Mark Ames (2014) has
highlighted the high-profile case of secret agreements among Apple, Google, Intel, and
other major tech companies to restrict employee poaching through wage competition. The
increasingly widespread problem of “non-compete clauses” and other forms of anticompetitive behavior in labor markets across the US is reported in a study by Naidu et al.
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(2018) who argue in favor of a clear need to extend antitrust regulations to labor markets.
These studies provide good reason to believe that recent increases in labor market
concentration and collusive behavior among employers impose downward pressure on
wage growth which should directly contribute to a decline in the labor share assuming labor
productivity growth remains constant.
Extending the search-and-matching framework, the dynamic generalized
monopsony model developed by Alan Manning (2003) highlights also the central
importance of intra-firm worker mobility in the determination of wages. The limiting factor
in the ability of employers to suppress wages is the ability of workers to switch to another
employer, typically one offering a higher wage or otherwise higher levels of compensation.
The extent to which workers can leverage an outside option to “make good” on quit threats
depends on the availability of extant job offers and also the costs on the firm if the worker
leaves. An important factor in wage determination then may be represented in the ratio of
the job offer arrival rate to the job separation rate. This ratio provides a measure of the
fraction of workers recruited from other employers and provides a proxy to the difficultto-measure elasticity of labor supply. Labor markets with lower fractions of recruits from
employment indicate markets with higher degrees of monopsonistic power (Manning 2003,
44). Apart from labor market concentration and anti-competitive behavior on the part of
firms, important factors affecting the offer arrival and separation rates of individual
workers include general barriers to employment and labor mobility, high turnover rates,
gender and racial discrimination, and imperfect information.
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In general, this view is consistent with aggregate impacts on the wage distribution
more in-line with cyclical movements in the labor share and employment along the lines
of the Goodwin growth cycles. An earlier study provides data showing the proportion of
recruits from non-employment falls as labor markets tighten, indicating that job mobility
between workers tends to be pro-cyclical (Burgess 1993; cited in Manning 2003, 49). By
plotting unemployment rates differentiated by educational level as in Figure 9, we can
extend this view of wage stagnation to understand how dynamic monopsony power, by
generating greater impacts on less-skilled workers, may augment or parallel the impacts of
skill-biased technical change in driving inequality between educational groups.

Figure 9: Unemployment Rate by Educational Group 1979-2020

Source: Economic Policy Institute, State of Working America Data Library, “[Unemployment ],” 2019. Current
Population Survey Outgoing Rotation Group microdata
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Dynamic monopsony theory provides further justification to the role of market
structure and institutions in explaining cross-country variation in declining labor shares
and wage inequality. Using data from longitudinal labor market surveys for the US and the
UK, Manning calculates the fraction of recruits from non-employment as a measure of
monopsony power. Manning’s calculations indicate that the fraction of recruits from nonemployment is higher in the US than in the UK, and that the fraction of non-employment
recruits is higher in the US for women, for young and very old workers, for low-skilled
workers, workers in full-time education, and black workers (Manning 2003, 47). Groups
that face suboptimal labor market outcomes turn out to be those more frequently recruited
from a position of non-employment, implying that prevailing wages are lower where
competition among employers for workers is less intense (Manning 2003, 49). Moreover,
labor market policy related to unemployment benefits (which augment workers’ outside
option), standardization requirements, anti-discrimination laws, and other worker
protections may alter the extent of competition between employers and provide a
compensating effect on the market outcome for workers. Overall, these findings capture
the degree of variation between the US and the UK in terms of market structure and
institutional checks.

Worker Power
The “market power” literature reviewed above has maintained that declining labor
shares can be explained on the basis of rising monopoly power in product markets or rising
monopsony power in labor markets. Another group of economists (Bivens et al. 2018;
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Stansbury and Summers 2020) have pointed out that wage stagnation is theoretically
possible even when firms’ market power is unchanged if workers experience a collapse in
bargaining power. What’s more, these economists offer direct evidence that declines in
worker power have a more substantial empirical impact on wage stagnation and wage
inequality than increases in firms’ market power. Bivens et al. (2018) conclude that labor
market concentration has negatively impacted wages in the US but the magnitude of its
impact has been limited, accounting for only a small portion (3.5 percent) of the divergence
between pay and productivity for the median worker.
While the analysis in Azar et al. (2017) showed that the average labor markets in
the US suffered from high degrees of concentration, the wide variation in HHI scores across
provides little information about labor markets in which the typical person works. Labor
market concentration indeed presents a real challenge for workers in rural areas and smaller
urban areas, however there is reason to believe that most people work in labor markets with
low to moderate degrees of concentration (Bivens et al. 2018). Moreover, while product
market concentration has seen secular increases across six major employment sectors in
the US since 1983, the extent of concentration also varies substantially and is shown to
account for a significant, but still small portion (10 percent) of the divergence between pay
and productivity for the median worker (Bivens et al. 2018).
Additionally, Stansbury and Summers (2020) have pointed out that since 1973, the
declining US labor share has coincided with a substantial decline in average unemployment
rates at the same time that inflation rates have remained low and showed little signs of
acceleration pressures. These signs point toward a decline in the non-accelerating inflation
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rate of unemployment (NAIRU), a recent trend which undermines explanations of labor
share declines based on market power increases. Standard economic theory behind
monopoly and monopsony power predict that rising market power in product and labor
markets should push both inflation and unemployment upwards. While, from a theoretical
standpoint, a rise in monopoly or monopsony power (or both) would be sufficient to explain
why labor shares have declined, it is difficult to reconcile observed trends in the NAIRU
with an increase in either monopoly or monopsony power. A general decline in worker
power, rather than an increase in monopoly and monopsony power, can more adequately
explain trends in wage stagnation that underlie declines in the labor share while being
consistent with the fall in the NAIRU.

Declines in Wage Premia
Evidence for broad-based declines in worker power in the US can be found in the
observed declines in wage premia across the economy. Wage premia give a measure of the
ability of certain workers (i.e. those in unions, those in strategic industries, those with
education) to bargain for wages at a level greater than the average population of workers.
Competitive markets in the neoclassical framework predict that workers are paid equal to
their marginal product and that there is no correlation between a worker’s pay and the
performance of their firm or industry. In practice, however it is observed that there is a
positive relationship between worker’s pay and firm/industry performance, suggestive of
some degree of rent-sharing (Stansbury and Summers 2020). For instance, workers in
larger firms or in certain industries (manufacturing, mining, telecommunications, utilities)
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receive substantial wage premia relative to ‘observably equivalent’ workers in smaller
firms or in other industries.
Stansbury and Summers (2020) show that the strength of this relationship has
diminished over-time and across the economy. Using household survey data, the authors
show that since the early 1980s there has been a decline in the large firm wage premia by
about one-third and a decline of around one-third in the dispersion of industry wage premia.
Moreover, they show evidence of secular wage premia declines in manufacturing industries
and in non-manufacturing sectors through a broad weakening in the relationship between
industrial concentration and labor compensation across sectors. Under this framework,
wage stagnation is understood as a decline in the capacity of the average worker to secure
a portion of firm rents. While wages have largely kept up with inflation, gains from
productivity increases have thus been retained largely by firms. Thus, the decline of the
labor share of income coincides with an unprecedented increase in corporate profits
(Eggertson et al. 2018).
Recent evidence suggests declining wage premiums are less pronounced for
workers with higher levels of human capital. According to the findings in Özdemir (2019),
the degree to which workers can claim a stable proportion of rents from productivity gains
may be positively related to education and skill level. Embedding this within the context
of skill-biased/routine-biased technical change offers a dynamic view of declining labor
shares and rising wage inequality, as a process occurring on the side of the ‘market wage’
and the ‘social wage.’ That is to say, the causes of declining labor shares are most likely
due to both a) demand/supply (market) considerations in the context of structural change
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and biased technical change and b) a decrease in the institutionally-determined bargaining
position of workers. What’s more, the facts of compensation inequality suggest clearly that
declines in bargaining power are not true for all wage-earners in the distribution. Thus,
rising inequality reflects structural inequalities in bargaining power which arise due to the
differential effects of biased technical change and institutional shifts.

Causes of Bargaining Power Decline
Declines in bargaining power across the wage distribution coincide with the onset
of key institutional shifts in the economy after the 1970's. Three interrelated sources of
bargaining power declines are identified in the literature and discussed in this section: 1)
decline of unions and union power, 2) policy shifts away from full employment monetary
policy toward price stability and flexible labor markets, and 3) financial deregulation, the
financialization of the economy and the rise of the maximum shareholder value conception
of the firm.

The Falling Power of Unions
The most apparent example of institutional shift is the decline of unions and the
growing decentralization of wage bargaining. Dramatic declines in unionization for the US
are observed in both the union density and union coverage rate. Union density refers to the
proportion of the labor force who are members in a union, while the union coverage rate
measures the proportion of the labor force covered by union collective bargaining
agreements. Figure 10 depicts the overall process of “de-unionization” in the US. The total
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union membership rate in the US fell from 29.3% in 1964 to around 10.9% in 2020, while
union coverage fell from just below its height at 24% in 1979 to around 8% in 2020.
Compared to other advanced countries in Europe and Japan, the US now exhibits a much
lower union density and coverage rate. Given that the majority of advanced economies
have experienced significant deindustrialization in the same period, these differences
appears to be a cause of institutional variation in support for unions.

Figure 10: De-unionization in the US 1964-2020

Source: Hirsch et al. (2001)

Furthermore, falling union membership has been dramatically more pronounced in
the private sector than in the public sector (Mishel et al. 2020). The collapse of the share
of workers in a private sector union has resulted in direct impacts on the wages of middlewage workers (Rosenfeld et al. 2016) and has resulted in the secular decline of the private
sector union wage premium (Stansbury and Summers 2020). The decline of union coverage
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is linked to an observed decline in the overall private sector wage premium, denoting an
impact of de-unionization also on the wages of non-union workers. De-unionization trends
explain in part why the US has seen declines in the US manufacturing wage premia from
the 1980’s to the 2000’s, while manufacturing wage premia have gone up in Continental
European countries with comparably higher rates of unionization (Novga and Pugacheva
2019).
Union coverage fell in all US states over the period 1980-2013 albeit with
significant variation. Here the problem of endogeneity comes up with the likely connection
between deindustrialization and de-unionization. If a substantial portion of the declines in
unionization rates and coverage can be explained with the erosion of manufacturing jobs,
which have traditionally formed the base of union membership, especially in key locations
in the US Northeast and the Rust Belt, then estimates of the effect of unionization rates on
income and wage distribution will be significantly biased (Blau and Kahn 1999).
Controlling for differences in industrial composition and demographics,
econometric evidence indicates that US states with the largest declines in union coverage
have experienced more stagnant growth in real wages at the median (Manchin 2016).
Declining coverage affects non-union workers in a variety of channels. For instance,
employers may raise wages for its non-union workforce as a means of averting the threat
of unionization (Leicht 1989; Farber 2005). The loss of strong unions means that employers
are less pressured to raise wages for their non-union workers. More generally, unions play
a central role in cementing sector-wide and economy-wide norms for fair pay (Western and
Rosenfeld 2011).
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The impacts of unionization with respect to labor market outcomes are identified
in terms of between-group and within-group reductions in wage inequality. On one hand,
union membership is linked to higher wages for less-educated and blue-collar workers,
reducing inequality between educational and occupational groups. On the other hand, the
capacity of unions to influence non-union wages through union coverage and other normsetting behavior tends to standardize wage levels within firms and industries (Western and
Rosenfeld 2011). Accordingly, the decline of unions is directly associated with wage
stagnation and productivity-pay decoupling for the bottom 90 percent of the wage
distribution as well as rising wage inequality driven by top earners experiencing faster
wage growth (Manchin 2016).

Policy Reform and Institutional Shift
A group of economists propose a related but distinct perspective on wage
stagnation, arguing that the collapse of unions and worker power in general is driven by
conscious policy choices aiming to increase the competitiveness of labor markets
(Bronfenbrenner 2009; Bivens and Shierholz 2018; Bivens et al. 2018). In the aftermath of
the 1970’s stagflation crisis, fundamental shifts in the policy environment of the US
evolved out of the perceived failures of the Keynesian policy model. The emerging
consensus was that Keynesian demand-side management policies had failed to control high
inflation and resolve high unemployment. Policymakers sought alternative political
economic paradigms informed by free-market sentiments and increasingly turned toward
a set of neoliberal policy prescriptions centered on anti-inflationary monetary policy and
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labor market flexibility. The neoliberal paradigm was later “naturalized” in the
implementation of domestic and foreign policy as the best set of operating procedures to
manage economic growth in the era of “new fundamentals” dubbed the ‘New Economy’
of the dot-com era (Peck 2002). Regulatory reforms and preferential monetary policies
enabled American firms to gain access to foreign markets (finance, labor, trade etc.) on
favorable terms while suppressing domestic wage growth and weakening inflationary
pressures in tightening job markets (Peck 2002).
The early period of neoliberal reforms saw higher profits and economic expansion
from the 1980’s onward, however average unemployment rates remained relatively high.
This was a consequence of macroeconomic policy prioritizing stable and low inflation over
the reduction of unemployment. In the decade after 1979, high unemployment coincided
with stagnant wage growth until the subsequent boom period of the late 1990’s and early
2000’s, when the only period of strong wage growth in the post-1973 era was accompanied
by significant reductions in unemployment (Bivens and Shierholz 2018).
Given that the rate of wage growth should not exceed the rate of inflation under
anti-inflationary monetary policy, the main goal of price stability caused linkages between
macroeconomic policy and wage growth to be severed. Neoliberal policy reforms favored
flexible labor markets characterized by decentralized wage bargaining and the reduction of
policy-related ‘frictions’ and implicit costs of labor. These reforms were carried out by
withering away institutional support for unions, restricting access to unemployment
benefits and worker protections, and allowing the secular erosion of the real value of
minimum wages. Bivens et al. (2017) found in a poll of non-union workers that almost half
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would vote to establish a union immediately if given the chance, suggesting that union
decline is not driven by worker preferences. The steady decline of union coverage is
regarded in part as a failure of policy to ensure a level playing field between workers
seeking to organize and employers engaging in anti-union activities with growing intensity
(Bronfenbrenner 2009; cited in Bivens and Shierholz 2018).
The shift in institutional support away from unions was inaugurated in the highprofile case of the 1981 Professional Air Traffic Controller’s Organization (PATCO)
strike. President Reagan responded to PATCO workers' refusal of federal orders to return
to work by denying any concessions and firing 11,345 of the striking workers. Reagan's
firing of the government employees encouraged large private employers to hire
replacements for striking workers instead of seeking negotiation in labor conflicts
(McCartin 2011). On the other side, employers have increasingly taken to pursuing
aggressive strategies to limit the bargaining power of workers through means including
mandatory arbitration agreements and collective action waivers conditional for
employment, reclassifying workers as independent contractors, limiting worker access to
mandatory benefits by scheduling workers for less than full-time and giving unpredictable
schedules (Bivens and Shierholz 2018). Regardless of this behavior, policymakers have
not shown any significant effort toward leveling the playing field by curbing aggressive
behavior on the part of firms or ensuring sufficient worker protections.
Despite increases in productivity and the educational quality of the low-wage
workforce, the federal real minimum wage has fallen roughly 25 percent since its peak in
1968 (Cooper 2017). Policymakers in the post-1973 era have been unwilling to raise the
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federal minimum wage, leading to a steady decline in its real value since it cannot keep
pace with inflation. While the minimum wage is seen as a mechanism for alleviating
working poverty, the minimum wage can also play a role in influencing the relative
bargaining power for workers who earn near the minimum as well as those who earn above
the minimum.
In the wage bargaining framework provided by Mortenson and Pissarides (1994),
the worker-firm match generates a surplus between the value-added of the match and the
reservation wage, which includes policy factors like the minimum wage and
unemployment benefits in addition to the value of leisure or self-employment. In theory,
the expected wage of all workers across the wage distribution are affected by having a
minimum wage in a fashion consistent with a higher (lower) bargaining power derived
from lower (higher) job-switching costs. This general dynamic is shown in a state-level
analysis for the US by Malloy (2020) giving evidence that states with lower minimum
wages tend to exhibit higher levels of income inequality.
Since much of the increase in income inequality has been driven by higher-tail
rather than lower-tail inequality, Malloy’s results arguably point toward stagnant wage
growth for the bottom 90 percent of workers as a probable cause of higher inequality. A
declining real minimum wage is argued to undermine the bargaining power of all workers
in the wage distribution by increasing workers’ switching costs and is likely to contribute
downward pressure on the labor share of income. However, if wage-earners at or below
the median suffer from higher risk of job loss from exposure to precarious employment or
from ‘deskilling’ due to the impacts of routine-biased technical change then they may bear
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a greater brunt of the impact from declining real minimum wages. Similarly, workers in
high-end industries are largely sheltered from the impacts of de-unionization and falling
real minimum wages due to the growing segmentation of the US labor market into a
primary and secondary labor market.

Financialization and Shareholder Power
In opposition to the Keynesian consensus, the neoliberal paradigm emphasized the
self-regulatory power of the free market. Starting around the late 1970’s and mid 1980’s,
neoliberal reformers introduced subsequent waves of deregulation in financial markets
with the goal of enabling the financial system to stimulate rapid growth in the economy.
Policy makers repealed key statutes of the Glass-Steagall regulatory structure in 1980 and
1999 designed to limit the consolidation of the financial system. Major reforms repealed
regulatory controls on interest rates and ended the prohibition on bank mergers and interstate banking. Financial deregulation led to higher demand for investment in underregulated financial markets while the financial industry became greatly consolidated as a
result of bank mergers and the removal of regulatory barriers to cross-industry financial
activity (Tomaskovic-Devey and Lin 2011). The expansion of the financial system resulted
in the higher availability of credit and generated demand for financial investment in nonfinancial sectors of the economy, representing the ‘financialization’ of the real (nonfinancial) economy.
Financialization refers to two interdependent processes: 1) the increasing
importance of financial firms in economic, social, and political terms to society, and 2) the
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linked upward pressure on non-financial firms to speculate in financial markets to boost
returns on assets (Tomaskovic-Devey and Lin 2011). These processes are argued to play a
key role in declining labor shares and rising wage inequality as firms are enabled to create
and maintain economic rents by securing greater market power through political
manipulation of regulatory structures and monetary policy (Fligstein 2001). The growing
importance of financial firms and financial pressures on the real economy inflates the social
power of firms to guarantee steady profits, which tend to flow toward investment in
financial assets and as shareholder rents. Moreover, the rise of shareholder behavior in
non-financial firms has been shown to have resulted in a widespread reduction of
investment in the real economy (physical capital) and a general slowdown of capital
circulation (Stockhammer, 2004). In this respect, the financial system’s growing share of
GDP has been linked to the decoupling of GDP growth and employment growth (Assa
2016).
With the development of financialization “shareholder power” enters alongside
labor and capital as a claimant to the distribution of rents, generating substantial downward
pressure of the labor share. The rise of maximum shareholder value (MSV) behavior
among non-financial firms creates increasing pressures to cut labor costs in favor of the
maximization of profits and shareholder dividends. Among non-financial firms, their
increasing links to financial assets and investors established new shareholder strategies
which favored short-term speculation of financial instruments to boost dividends to the
detriment of investment in productive capacity (Tomaskovic-Devey and Lin 2011). The
pressures

of

shareholder

activism

are
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reductions/stagnation and workplace “fissuring” as companies increasingly outsource and
subcontract labor (Weil 2014). Additional factors impacting the functional distribution of
are income identified in Hein (2012) include rising dividend payments, increasing top
management salaries, hostile takeovers and mergers, and the overall downsizing of the
government sector.
The existence of shareholder power is explicitly supported by the analysis in
Eggertson et al., (2018), which estimates the capital share directly as opposed to simply
taking the residual of the labor share. This method reveals the existence and growth of a
third residual termed “pure profits”, the size of which has increased in the post-1973 era to
the detriment of both the labor share and the adjusted capital share measure. Dunhaupt
(2016) and Ozdemir (2019) show the labor share of income correlates negatively with
several indicators of financialization across a majority of OECD countries. This is
indicative of the undermining impact of increasingly “financialized” behavior of nonfinancial firms and changes in distributive dynamics such as rapidly rising top management
salaries and financial returns through dividends.
The US is part of a group of countries experiencing rising levels of household and
public debt, a fundamentally unsustainable process as long as the debt-to-income ratio
continues to grow. If the growth of debt persistently outpaces the growth of incomes, a
rising debt-to-income ratio eventually comes to have a negative impact on consumption as
interest payments occupy a higher portion of income and as the expansion of credit
contributes to financial instability and debt-related vulnerabilities (Stockhammer and
Onaran 2013).
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In particular, the continued expansion of credit and the establishment of new
financial inroads into non-financial sectors of the economy have resulted in a boom cycle
sustained by ever-growing levels of debt. The financialization of non-financial sectors in
the economy such as public goods markets (higher education and housing), along with a
general state of over-liquidity from low-interest rates have created a state in which the
growth of total debts (private and public) is outpacing the growth of GDP. In 2016, the
ratio for debt growth to GDP growth was roughly 4:1 (U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis,
2017). Considering the level of domestic debt that has supported growth since the recovery,
much of the new growth in the U.S. economy since 2008 appears to have been captured by
the financial sector, leading to a “crowding-out” of real economic growth (Ceccheti and
Kharroubi 2015). Overall, these processes disrupt the potential for equitable growth,
imposing significant pressures on the growth of wages and constituting a source of major
vulnerability for the sustainability of future economic growth.
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Chapter 6: Conclusion
This thesis has covered an empirical and theoretical review of the dynamics behind
structural change in the US and its effect on the functional distribution of income and
overall wage inequality. My aim was to address three key questions arise. First, what
empirical patterns of capital deepening and technical change have disrupted the
relationship between productivity and labor compensation in the US? Second, how can
particular patterns of observed bias in embodied technical change be regarded as arising
endogenously? Third, are purely technological-economic factors sufficient to explain the
problem of declining labor shares? This thesis argued that both economic and socioinstitutional factors are important in explaining the full phenomena of declining labor
shares and the rise of inequality since the mid-1970’s.
According to the framework in Elsby et al. (2013), there are two possible
explanations for declines in the aggregate labor share of income. First, in the case where
capital and labor are gross substitutes, a rise in the effective capital-labor ratio will lead to
a decline in the labor share. A rise in the effective capital intensity is consistent with either
capital deepening or capital-augmenting technical change, or both. Second, the case where
capital and labor are gross complements, a decline in the labor share necessitates a decline
in the effective capital-labor ratio, which is possible when technical change is net laboraugmenting in aggregate.
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Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014) have argued that declines in the price of capital
goods since the 1980’s have prompted an increased rate of capital deepening, while Elsby
et al. (2013) maintain that the decline in the US labor share may be accounted for by rising
import exposure and the offshoring potential of labor-intensive tasks. The “gross
substitutes” explanations depend on the elasticity of substitution being greater than one for
their arguments to hold. However, estimates placing the elasticity of substitution greater
than one are overshadowed by a preponderance of evidence in favor of the “gross
complements” perspective (Chirinko 2008; Chirinko and Mallick 2014). While the capitallabor ratio of the US has increased in recent decades it appears as though these increases
have been concentrated in manufacturing. However, this increase in capital intensity has
been driven by declining labor input requirements rather than additional capital investment.
The cause of layoffs and restructuring is identified in the higher relative rates of labor
productivity growth in manufacturing, rather than exposure to trade and offshoring
opportunities - indicating a decline in the effective capital labor ratio due to net laboraugmenting technical change (Lawrence 2015).
At the sectoral level, the relative stability of aggregate factor shares has obscured
substantial variation in labor share movements within sectors. Declines in labor shares in
advanced economies are typically concentrated in manufacturing, mining, transportation,
and other sectors (Karabarbounis and Neiman 2013). Declines in the labor shares within
manufacturing industries reflect substantial decreases in the employment share of
manufacturing (deindustrialization) rather than stagnant compensation growth (Lawrence
2015). Deindustrialization is driven mainly by labor-augmenting technical change with a
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strong labor-saving bias. Labor-augmenting technical change is uniquely labor-saving in
manufacturing and other industries (agriculture) in part due to these industries’ amenability
for standardization, which contributes to relatively high elasticities of substitution and
capital-labor ratio growth.
Overall, technological change has become more labor-displacing over time, with
the largest labor-displacing effects after 2000. This labor-displacing effect of technology
is generally biased against low-skilled workers and workers in routine-intensive industries.
This phenomenon is linked to the emergence and diffusion of advanced equipment and ICT
capital, which is characterized by capital-skill complementarity. The main implication of
capital-skill complementarity is that as the capital stock increases, the marginal
productivity of high-skilled workers increases while decreasing for low-skilled workers overtime leading to falling labor shares for less-skilled workers and rising labor shares for
higher-skilled workers as seen in the data (ILO 2011).
Routine-biased technical change is linked to the “hollowing-out” of middle-skill,
middle-income, routine-biased jobs (including manufacturing), leading to a process of
labor market polarization. With labor market polarization caused by RBTC, the returns to
education become more important for explaining wage inequality - as a matter of skill
premia and penalties. The employment effects of technologically-driven structural change
reflect the notion that labor-augmenting technological change is not neutral - exhibiting
biases toward labor-saving in key industries and capital-skill complementarity, more
generally. From where does this bias come from?
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According to the induced innovation hypothesis (Hicks-Kaldor-Kennedy), the bias
of technical change can be thought of as arising endogenously as a result of firms’ choice
of production techniques. Firms choose the profit-maximizing rate of technical change by
‘economizing’ greater savings on the more expensive factor. In advanced economies, the
more expensive factor is typically labor given the progression of capital deepening (which
drives down the marginal product of capital). Optimizing behavior ensures that factor
shares converge on to long-run constant values with Harrod-neutral technical change.
Acemoglu’s theory of directed technical change provides a refined formulation of
the induced innovation hypothesis allowing for medium-run movements in factor shares in
response to perturbations, as in a “wage-push” shock. Profit incentives determine the flow
of resources toward specific kinds of innovation, where the determination of technical bias
is directly linked to distributive shares. During the economy’s transition to equilibrium, a
higher labor share will tend to induce higher rates of labor productivity. The steady increase
in the relative supply of capital combined with an elasticity of substitution below one gives
firms the incentive to invest predominantly in labor-augmenting technical change, leading
to long-run technical progress to be labor-augmenting but not purely Harrod-neutral.
However, the medium-run direction of technical change may adopt either a laboraugmenting or capital-augmenting form.
Acemoglu’s theory of directed technical change may be extended to account for
heterogeneous workers and capital-skill complementarity. Supply and demand
considerations enter into the potential for skill-biased technical change through the
interaction between the price effect and the market size effect. When the elasticity of
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substitution is less than one, the price effect dominates, and the emerging pattern of
technical progress is unskilled-augmenting. An increase in the relative supply of skilled
labor induces a pattern of unskilled-augmenting technical change which, for an elasticity
of substitution less than one, has a skill-biased pattern (Acemoglu 2002a). Thus, an
increase in the relative supply of skilled labor always leads to skill-biased technical change.
Technological progress, independent of the assumed value of the elasticity of substitution,
always generates a skill-biased pattern for an increase in the relative supply of skilled labor.
In Chapter 4, I cover an alternative perspective of growth and distribution from the
other side of the capital controversy. From this perspective, income distribution is not
determined by the marginal productivity of factors but rather as the outcome of institutional
conditions and class conflict. A key observation from this perspective is that secular
increases in the productivity of labor are generally associated with declines in the
productivity of capital. This indicates an aggregate pattern of technical change that is laborsaving and capital-using, called Marx-biased technical change since a falling capital
productivity leads to a tendency in the profit rate to fall. This particular pattern of technical
change can be considered to come from inherent biases in capitalist production or as a
response of firms to profit incentives (a lá the induced innovation hypothesis).
“Social thermostat” forces are considered to explain the historical phenomena of
wages rising with productivity according to Kaldor’s long-run facts of growth (Foley
2003). These social forces are well formalized in Goodwin growth cycles, which generate
perpetual limit cycles in the labor share and the employment rate according to the
“symbiotic contradictions” of capitalism (van der Ploeg 1985). Extending the Goodwin
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model to include endogenous technical change is practically equivalent to handing
capitalists an additional tool for class conflict, causing a break in the symmetric position
of workers and capitalists in the perpetual limit cycle. With induced innovation, costminimizing firms eventually manage to stabilize the limit cycle and converge the economy
toward purely labor-augmenting technical change with constant, but asymmetric factor
shares and constant long-run employment.
Since MBTC is associated with a falling rate of profit it cannot go on forever (with
firms switching to capital-saving, labor-using technical change after a critical point).
However, the profit rate need not fall, ceteris paribus, if there is a decline in the labor share
- which is possible according to rapid gains in labor productivity or institutional shifts
exogenous to the model, or both. While we can view institutions as playing a role in
mediating the impacts of market forces through compensation and redistribution
mechanisms, it is also possible to consider institutions as playing a role in shaping market
forces themselves. Identifying the significance of institutional forces in determining
distributional outcomes begs the question of whether market forces are sufficient to fully
explain the disruption between average labor compensation and average productivity.
Stansbury and Summers (2018) provide evidence to the contrary, pointing instead
to the relative importance of non-technological factors - shifts in the balance of power
between firms, workers, and shareholders. While increases in monopoly and monopsony
power have contributed downward pressure on wages, the main factor to consider here is
a sustained collapse in workers’ bargaining power (consistent with a decline in the US
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NAIRU) caused by 1) de-unionization, 2) neoliberal policy reforms, and 3) financialization
and the rise of shareholder power.
These declines in bargaining power are not felt proportionally across the wage-skill
distribution (unemployment and labor demand are important factors), with declining wage
premia being less pronounced for workers with higher levels of human capital (Ozdemir
2019) and in specific industries like finance or information technology. This particular
finding suggests that wage premia accorded to skill-level represents also an increase in
rents for high-skilled workers relative to less-skilled workers. The massive increase in the
share of top incomes following the Reagan era reflects a growing concentration of capital
incomes near the top through capital gains, profits, and dividends, as well as labor incomes
in the form of executive salaries, bonuses, and quasi-rents for high-skilled workers in
certain industries (finance, technology). Embedding this within the context of routinebiased technical change offers a dynamic view of declining labor shares and rising wage
inequality as a process occurring due to structural change and institutional changes (i.e.
market structure) that have caused wage premia to rise above the level that would occur
under competitive conditions. This feature presents a challenge to researchers given the
endogeneity between various supposed causes (over-determination). As a matter for future
research, the stagnant economic growth since the 2008 crisis in the US and Europe raises
the possibility of under-consumption playing a role in driving secular stagnation.
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